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IMPLICIT DIVESTITURE OF TRIBAL POWERS:




The United States Supreme Court has been severely criticized by tribal
leaders,' tribal advocates,2 and scholars3 for its treatment of tribal powers of
self-government. The Court has been charged with straying too far from John
Marshall's "original proposition" that tribes are "distinct political communities,
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and
having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only
acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States."4 Put another way, the
Court has substantially diluted the theory and substance of tribal sovereignty
formulated in the early days of the republic.5
The modem Court readily admits that its conception of tribal sovereignty
has not remained static over the years, but has evolved "in response to changed
circumstances."6  These circumstances have included dramatic shifts in
© 1994 N. Bruce Duthu
* Associate Professor, Vermont Law School. B.A., 1980, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1983,
Loyola University School of Law, New Orleans.
1. E.g., Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice of the Navajo Supreme Court, Remarks to the
Association of American Law Schools, Section on American Indian Law (Jan. 7, 1994). Chief
Justice Yazzie, in criticizing the confused state of jurisdictional law in Indian country, said, "We
have lives to talk about." Id.
2. E.g., Craig J. Dorsay, Address at New York University Colloquium on the Native
American Struggle: Conquering the Rule of Law (Apr. 11, 1992) (urging tribal advocates to
exercise extreme caution in litigating issues which may reach the Supreme Court). Dorsay
represented Klamath tribal member Alfred Smith and argued his case, Employment Div., Dep't
of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
3. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REv. 77 (1993); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The
Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White
Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 219; Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and
Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 381 (1993).
4. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832).
5. See generally Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 1; Williams, supra note 3. Some of the strongest criticism has come from Justices on the
Court. See especially Justice Blackmun's opinions partially concurring and partially dissenting
in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,448-68
(1989), and in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
502 U.S. 251, 269-78 (1992).
6. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973).
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congressional Indian policy and ideology, ranging from the assimilationist
strategies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the current
policy of tribal self-determination (and some shifts in between). Treaty making,
the hallmark of early Indian policy, abruptly ended in 1871, although extant
treaties were preserved. Perhaps most notable, the federal government's
allotment policy in the late nineteenth century precipitated wholesale changes
in the demographic makeup of many Indian reservations by opening up former
tribal lands to homesteading by non-Indians The resulting social, cultural and
political disruption in Indian life mirrored the clashing ideologies on tribal
sovereignty. Did tribal sovereignty survive? And if so, in what form and to
what extent?
The answer to the first question universally is "Yes." Tribes continue to
possess inherent powers of self-government.' The answer to the second
question is, "It depends." It depends, in part, on whether a federal enactment
addresses the issue. Where treaty, constitutional authority, or statutory authority
exists, a court's interpretive role is fairly well circumscribed both by the
language of the enactment and by rules or canons of treaty/statutory
construction unique to the field of federal Indian law.'
Difficulties arise, however, when no positive law exists. Until 1978, courts
generally applied a presumptive rule supporting retained tribal powers in the
absence of contrary congressional expression. However, in 1978, the
Supreme Court declared that Indian tribes "are prohibited from exercising both
those powers of autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress
and those powers 'inconsistent with their status.."" The atavistic reference to
"status" recalls John Marshall's characterization of tribes as "domestic
dependent nations."'" The Court's "implicit divestiture" theory'3 has since
7. For a detailed historical analysis of the vacillations in federal Indian policy, see FRANCIS
P. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER (abridged ed. 1984); see also FREDERICK HOXIE, A FINAL
PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATETHE INDIANS, 1880-1920 (1984); D'ARCY McNICKLE,
NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBALISM: INDIAN SURVIVALS AND RENEWALS (1973).
8. FEuX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 231 (Rennard Strickland et al.
eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN].
9. Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review ofIndian Treaty Abrogation:
'As Long As Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth'- How Long a Time Is That?, 63
CAL. L. REV. 601, 608-19 (1975). Wilkinson and Volkman identify three primary rules of
construction: (1) ambiguous expressions must be resolved in the Indians' favor, (2) Indian treaties
must be interpreted as the Indians themselves would have understood them; and (3) Indian treaties
must be liberally construed in favor of the Indians. Id. See generally Martha A. Field, Sources
of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986).
10. COHEN, supra note 8, at 231; see also Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 22
(1934).
11. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
12. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). Marshall wrote,
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which
must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases.
Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States
354 [Vol. 19
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been applied, reworked, and expanded in several subsequent decisions.
Significant areas of tribal jurisdictional authority have been affected, usually
to the tribes' detriment; these areas include criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians,'4 hunting and fishing regulatory control throughout the
reservation,'5 and zoning authority.'6 Ironically, this judicial reworking of the
jurisdictional scheme in Indian country comes at a time of unparalleled
congressional support for tribal self-determination."
This article will explore the Supreme Court's creation and subsequent use
of implicit divestiture as a theory delimiting tribal political authority. The
article will explore this theory within the larger context of the Court's struggle
to articulate principles applicable to the radically changed geopolitical and
cultural landscape of today's Indian reservations. The article will also consider
whether the Court correctly perceives its interpretive role in the absence of
textual congressional direction.
This analysis will reveal that the Court's approach is fundamentally flawed.
Implicit divestiture lacks coherent structure, a sense of limits, that give theories
value and predictive worth. Additionally, it is overly burdened with historical
and ethnocentric biases that run antithetically to the notion of retained tribal
powers.
The article offers two alternative approaches to give courts better guidance
in resolving questions about tribal authority. The first approach builds on
recent scholarship in political philosophy that finds support for the maintenance
of communities, including political communities, in classical liberal theory.'"
resembles that of a ward to his guardian.
Id. The Court's opinion in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), expressly held that
implicit divestiture operates as a result of the tribe's "dependent status." Id at 326.
13. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326.
14. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
15. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct.
2309 (1993).
16. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989).
17. Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1453 (1988); Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a-450n (1988 & Supp.
V 1993); Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988); American Indian
Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988); Tribally Controlled Community
College Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1852 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Indian Mineral
Development Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (1988); Indian Consolidation Act of 1983, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2201-2211 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); National Indian Forest Resources Management Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 3101-3120 (Supp. V 1993); Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721
(1988 & Supp. V 1993); Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§
3001-3013 (Supp. V 1993); Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 3201-3211 (Supp. V 1933); Indian Health Care Amendments of 1990, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1613-
1682 (Supp. V 1993).
18. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); WILL KYMLICKA,
LIBERALISM, COMMUNrrY AND CULTURE (1989); Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to
No. 2]
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The work of Will Kymlicka and his defense of liberalism is particularly
relevant in this setting because his paradigmatic group are the indigenous
peoples of North America, particularly the First Nations of Canada.
The second approach actually relies on Congress and its preeminent role in
Indian affairs.'9 It will explore avenues Congress can and should pursue to
redirect the discourse on tribal-state-federal relations. It will reveal that while
Congress has demonstrated concern for tribes' ability to function effectively in
a ange of political, cultural, and regulatory milieus, it has not articulated clear
and principled guideposts to help courts and advocates steer through the
"jurisdictional maze"" on today's reservations.
Part I will briefly outline relevant portions of the historical record to
illuminate and provide context for the changing demographic profile of Indian
country and the ideological shifts underlying federal-tribal political relations.
Much of this field has been plowed thoroughly by others.2' Nonetheless a
brief overview is required to establish a foundation for subsequent commentary.
Part II will develop the jurisprudential record in response to these significant
changes and will devote particular attention to the Court's creation and
continued use of implicit divestiture to delimit tribal authority. It will critique
the theory's inherent value as a workable legal principle while questioning the
institutional authority of the judicial branch that promulgated it. Part Ill will
offer a theoretical paradigm that justifies and hopefully secures a greater
measure of tribal political authority over property and persons within Indian
country. This theory builds on Kymlicka's formulation of liberalism and ties
it in more directly to the unique problems of reservations of mixed political
and cultural communities. Finally, part IV will explore avenues that Congress
should pursue to bring direction, predictability, and security in this complex
area.
One last question before moving on: Why bother? Kymlicka notes that if
this were purely an issue about the "special status" of tribes within the United
Rescue, 47 VAND. L. Rav. 673 (1994); Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man"Revisited: Liberalism,
Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171 (1992).
19. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). This argument assumes but does
not concede Congress's preeminent role in Indian affairs.. It accepts that as between the states and
th, federal government, the Constitution accords Congress the power to engage with the Indian
tribes. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. It does not accept that Congress's power extends to the point
of completely obliterating the political authority of tribes. See generally Nell Jessup Newton,
Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195
(1984); see also Mark Savage, Native Americans and the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 57 (1991).
20. See Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARiz. L. REv. 503 (1976).
21. The literature on American Indian-federal relations is too vast and multifaceted to attempt
a listing here. However, a general overview is provided in PRUCHA, supra, note 7; COHEN, supra
note 8, at 47-206; Dorris, The Grass Still Grows, the Rivers Still Flow: Contemporary Native
Americans, 110 DAEDALUs 43 (1981).
[Vol. 19
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss2/3
DIVESTITURE OF TRIBAL POWERS
States, ethnocentric tendencies alone might dissuade us from pursuing it. He
is probably right, but one hopes he is wrong. Recognizing individual and group
differences, and according these differences value and protection under the law
is fairly new work in North America. The issue is particularly acute for
American Indians who, despite a long history of self-rule, are still quite
vulnerable to the forces of assimilation and subjugation.'
The enterprise is useful, indeed necessary, because it puts the United States
visibly out on the international stage in its treatment of indigenous people. This
effort is appropriate when one considers that "[fliar more of the world's
minorities are in a similar position to American Indians (i.e., as a stable and
geographically distinct historical community with separate language and culture
rendered a minority by conquest or immigration or the redrawing of political
boundaries)."u This realization has implications for United States foreign
interventionism in the post-Cold War era when the federal government
increasingly must justify - to Americans and to the international community
- its incursions into foreign internecine struggles, many of which involve
indigenous peoples.' This justification necessarily will have to include
consideration of the United States' own record in protecting the self-governing
rights of American Indian tribes.
I. A Brief Historical Sketch
The Constitution authorizes Congress to "regulate Commerce ... with the
Indian Tribes."'  The Supreme Court has generally afforded Congress an
extraordinarily wide berth to establish federal Indian policy2 That policy has
vacillated between two poles. At various times, the government pursued
policies aimed at the immediate or eventual assimilation of American Indians
into the general American polity; at other times, it pursued policies aimed at
maintaining a "measured separatism"' between Indian tribes and white
22. KYMLICKA, supra note 18, at 257.
23. Leslie Chapman, a Laguna Pueblo, objected to the Indian Civil Rights Act's tendency
to treat Indians and concepts of justice as monolithic. She said,
Even within the Anglo system, you can see the Constitution and due process do
not necessarily yield justice. If you are concerned with how people feel and what
is the effective way, what is functional in terms of the people on the reservation,
the recognition of difference is going to have to be made.
JOHN R. WUNDER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS & THE BILL
OF RIGrs 141 (1994).
24. KYMLICKA, supra note 18, at 257-58.
25. See generally S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary International
Law, 82 ARIZ. J. INTL & COMP. L. 1 (1991).
26. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
27. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,56 (1978) ("Congress has plenary
authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes
otherwise possess.").
28. CHARLES WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 4 (1987).
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settlements.' These ideological shifts in policy were usually accompanied by
shifts in federal Indian land practices. A significant question to bear in mind
as we prpceed is whether the ideologies described above actually represent
"competing" ideologies. In other words, did the ideological discourse
manifested in shifting government policies allow for "cultural relativism," the
notion that tribes were intended to maintain cultural, political, and territorial
autonomy even while surrounded by an Americanized and otherwise "civilized"
body politic?"
The earliest federal policy, falling on the side of "measured separatism,"
continued the colonial practices of accommodating Indian interests. Beyond
maintaining the status quo in intergovernmental relations, including the colonial
policy of making treaties with tribes, the policy was pragmatic. Large tribal
confederations like the Iroquois Confederacy were extant and posed a
continued threat to the nascent republic. In 1789, Henry Knox, the first
Secretary of War, wrote to President Washington urging that the government
pursue a "liberal system of justice" toward the tribes." This system included
protecting the tribes' territorial rights. Knox wrote,
The Indians, being the prior occupants, possess the right of the
soil. It cannot be taken from them unless by their consent, or by
rights of conquest in case of just war. To dispossess them on any
other principle would be a great violation of the fundamental laws
of nature and of that distributive justice which is the glory of a
nation.32
Secretary Knox and President Washington prevailed on Congress to pass
legislation protecting Indian territorial claims and curtailing abuses by settlers
on tribal lands.33 In 1790, Congress passed the first in a series of
nonintercourse acts restricting conveyances of Indian lands. The Acd
prohibited private purchases of Indian lands unless made by public treaty with
the United States?5
Two interpretations are possible here. In one view, statutory protection of
tribal lands coupled with continued treaty making reflected some support for
29. Id. at 13; see also PRUCHA, supra note 7, at 64.
30. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835,
at 706 (1988).
31. McNICKLE, supra note 7, at 52-53.
32. Frederick E. Hoxie, The Curious Story of Reformers and the American Indians, in
INDIANS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 210 (Frederick E. Hoxie ed., 1988).
33. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
34. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988).
35. PRUCHA, supra note 7, at 31. Tribal land claims premised on this act have been
successful as recently as 1985. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S.
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the notion of an autonomous tribal political state with a recognized and
protected territorial base. A second, more cynical, view suggests that federal
policy sought to imbue tribes with sufficient legal status to legitimize the
transfers of vast amounts of land via treaty; the statutory enactments were
instruments designed to protect the federal prerogative in these usurpations
Clearly, only the former view would accord dignity to the concept of tribal
sovereignty by treating tribes as legitimate political entities capable of entering
and being bound by these bilateral agreements. 7
Persistent encroachment by whites on Indian lands provoked consideration
on the part of federal officials to reconsider this policy. As Prucha notes,
"[T]here were dreams that the problems could be eliminated once and for all
by inducing the eastern Indians to exchange their lands for territory west of the
Mississippi, leaving the area between the Appalachians and the Father of the
Waters free for white exploitations."" The Louisiana Purchase in 1803
enhanced the appeal of this idea, and Thomas Jefferson promoted the idea of
an exchange.39 Subsequent administrations also took up the proposal, but it
was not until Jackson's presidency in the 1830s that the proposal became reality
and led to the infamous "Trail of Tears."' The Cherokee Nation's
36. Eric Cheyfitz, Savage Law: The Plot Against American Indians in Johnson and
Grahtam's Lessee v. M'Jntosh and the Pioneers, in CULTURES OF UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM
109 (Amy Kaplan & Donald E. Pease eds., 1993).
The importance of [Johnson] is that it translated Indian notions of native peoples'
relation to their lands into the language of Anglo-American property law - that
language where "title" is the supreme term - not so that Indians could be
empowered in that language, but so that ultimate power over their lands, the
historical inalienability of which constituted their cultures, could be "legally"
transferred to the federal government. In short, Johnson v. M'Intosh translates
Indian lands into the terms of title so that title over these lands can be claimed by
the govemment; and in doing this, it becomes the cornerstone of the establishment
of federal Indian law.
Id. at 110. This fascinating article reads Johnson in relation to James Fenimore Coopers novel,
The Pioneers, also published in 1823.
37. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), the opinions of Marshall and
Johnson employ differing interpretive strategies based on the same textual evidence. Marshall
writes, "Tribes have been'uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our country. The
numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize them as a people capable of
maintaining the relations of peace and war. Id. at 16. Johnson, on the other hand, found the
treaties employed "the language of sovereigns and conquerors, and not the address of equals to
equals." Id. at 22-23.
Why the difference? We'll never truly know - and that's the point. Interpretive strategies call
into play the interpreter's values which influence, to some degree, the decision-making process.
Marshall's interpretation of the Cherokee treaties was obviously influenced by an interpretive
strategy which considered morality and a palpable sense of sympathy for the Cherokee position.
See id. at 15.
38. PRUCHA, supra note 7, at 65.
39. Id.
40. See generally CHEROKEE REMOvAL, BEFORE AND AFTER (William L. Anderson ed.,
No. 2]
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unsuccessful efforts to resist removal are legendary and culminated in the
famous Cherokee cases before the United States Supreme Court!' These
foundational decisions are discussed in more depth in the next section.
This period of United States history is inordinately complex and has
justifiably drawn the attention of numerous scholars. This brief historical
account cannot and does not hold pretensions of capturing the full scope of
historical, ideological, and political struggles that characterize this era. The
summary suggests, however, that the removal policy reflected a fundamental
shift in the government's attitude toward Indian lands, a shift away from the
government's original willingness to preserve Indian lands amidst non-Indian
demands for territorial expansion 2 The removal policy did not, however,
reflect a substantial ideological shift in the notion that tribes were distinct
political entities entitled to a measure of political and geographical autonomy.
Tribes would still be tribes in the political sense; they would just have to
maintain that existence in another place.43
1991).
41. Historian Theda Perdue explores the complex issue of the Cherokee political system and
class structure as a prelude to the Nation's signing a removal treaty. She finds evidence of a
"rising middle class" in Cherokee society, a group
envious of the wealth and power of the elite and disdainful of the desires of the
masses, and who saw in the removal issue an opportunity to usurp political
authority and to reap rewards and concessions from the United States. Members
of this class, and not the "common Indians," are the ones who ultimately 'burst
their bonds of slavery' by negotiating a removal treaty.
Theda Perdue, The Conflict Within: Cherokees and Removal, in CHEROKEE REMOVAL, BEFORE
AND AFTER (William L. Anderson ed., 1991) at 55, 66-67. Historian Michael D. Green presents
a similar but expanded historical treatment of Creek government and its response to removal in
MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE PoLrrTcs OF INDIAN REMOVAL: CREEK GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY
IN CRISIS (1982). Green describes the complexity of Creek political and social organization
during this period. He reveals how an opportunistic group of Creek leaders, led by William
McIntosh, essentially "sold out" the Nation by entering into a removal treaty without full
authority of the Creek Council. McIntosh was ultimately executed by the Creek Nation in
accordance with Creek law. Id. at 97. Green writes,
While the Creeks had adopted certain Anglo-American legal concepts, they had
welded them to their own assumptions of political independence and used them
to serve decidedly Creek purposes. The execution of William McIntosh for the
treason of the Treaty of Indian Springs was the pivotal moment in the history of
Creek Council government.
Id.
42. PRUCHA, supra note 7, at 64-77.
43. One of the best political, historical, and legal accounts of this complex era as it relates
specifically to the Indian questions is an article by historian Joseph C. Burke. Joseph C. Burke,
The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969). On
the point that tribal political existence was preserved during this tumultuous time, Burke writes,
While Monroe and Adams had urged removal by every kind of inducement,
officially they continued to treat the tribes as more or less sovereign nations and
to respect their right to remain on the treaty lands. Whereas circumstances had
permitted them to postpone decision on the Indian question, the intransigence of
360 [Vol. 19
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United States Indian policy in the mid-nineteenth century was dominated by
the creation of reservations." This policy was animated by two concerns: (1)
ensuring the safety of non-Indian settlers and pioneers traveling through Indian
territories and (2) facilitating the ultimate civilization of Indian people.45 The
latter objective was accomplished, in large part, through the work of Christian
missionaries contracted by the federal government to run schools on
reservations." By the 1880s, a confluence of several historical events and
circumstances precipitated yet another shift in federal policy - this time
directed at both the tribes' territorial land bases and their distinct political
systems. Again, extended treatment of this complex historical period is best left
to professional historians ' It can be noted, however, that desires for western
expansion (particularly post-Civil War), construction of more efficient
transportation systems,4 lust for newly found reserves of gold (in the Black
Hills of South Dakota and in California), and frustration at the "slow pace" of
Indian acculturation were interrelated factors leading federal officials to
reconsider the "Indian problem."
Congress, for its part, acted in 1871 to end the practice of treaty making
with tribes." While Congress continued to create reservations and enter into
agreements with tribes," the 1871 act signaled "a downgrading in the political
status of tribes."52
Georgia and the Cherokees did not allow Jackson such a luxury.
Id. at 504. Burke notes that Andrew Jackson had indicated as early as 1817 that he opposed the
practice of treating tribes as sovereign nations. According to Burke, Jackson "considered them
subjects of the United States whose only right to the land was that of occupancy for hunting
purposes." Id. at 504 n. 19. Indeed, Jackson chose the occasion of his First Annual Message, Dec.
8, 1829, to urge passage of a removal bill, in part to effectuate the "humane and considerate
attention" to tribal rights he promised in his inaugural address of Mar. 4, 1829, and in part, to
satisfy Georgia's demands that no separate political entity be maintained within Georgia
boundaries. Id. at 504 nn.19 & 21.
For a fascinating critique of Andrew Jackson's attitudes toward Indians, see Ronald N. Satz,
Rhetoric Versus Reality: The Indian Policy of Andrew Jackson, in CHEROKEE REMOvAL, BEFORE
AND AFTER 29-54 (William L. Anderson ed., 1991). Satz writes that the "historical evidence
clearly indicates that both the so-called devil and the revisionist 'angel' interpretations are too one-
dimensional and simplistic. Andrew Jackson did not admire the ways of Indian life, but his views
on Indian policy were shaped not so much by any ill will toward Indians as by his overwhelming
concern for the growth, unity, and security of white America." Id. at 35.
44. PRUCHA, supra note 7, at 211.
45. Id. at 182.
46. COHEN, supra note 8, at 139-40.
47. A leading study is FREDERICK E. HOxiE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO
AssIMILATE THE INDIANS, 1880-1920 (1984).
48. In the eyes of one senator, delaying construction of railroads because of treaty rights and
past promises was "poppycock." Id. at 48.
49. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566. This legislation, however, specifically
preserved the viability and enforceability of treaties entered into before 1871. Id.
50. See DAVID H. GETCHES Er AL, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 179 (3d
ed. 1993).
51. CHARLES WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 19 (1987). Congress's
No. 2]
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Other reform-minded individuals wanted Congress to do more. Prucha notes
that the Christian reformers who arrived on the scene in the early 1880s had
earlier supported the reservations as "protected enclaves in which the programs
of civilization and Americanization could move forward."52 Ultimately, these
reformers also advocated the elimination of reservations because they
"symbolized the great separation between the Indians and the rest of American
society, a separation that precluded the absolute Americanization that was the
ultimate goal of the reform organizations and their friends in the
government."53
Massachusetts Senator Henry L. Dawes was among the reformers'
government friends who also considered himself a friend of the Indians.' He
introduced legislation, the General Allotment Act of 1887,"5 which effectively
dismantled communal tribal lands and allotted lands to individual tribal
members under a trust patent of limited duration. Surplus lands were purchased
by the government and sold to non-Indian homesteaders.' The "Dawes Act"
was the centerpiece of an assimilationist program that included boarding
schools,' Indian police, and federal prohibitions of tribal cultural and religious
expression." Greed alone did not motivate this policy. On the contrary,
Prucha notes that allotment was not pushed through Congress by Westerners
"greedy for Indian lands, but by eastern humanitarians who deeply believed
that communal landholding was an obstacle to the civilization they wanted the
Indians to acquire and who were convinced that they had the history of human
experience on their side."59 Vesting Indians with private property would
accelerate their civilization and break up the communal land masses. The
policy certainly accomplished the latter. The tribal land mass deteriorated from
133 million acres in 1887 to 52 million acres in 1934.'
reasons for passing this act are usually attributed to internecine squabbling in Congress, the result
of some House members wanting a direct role in dealing with Indian tribes. The treaty process,
per the Constitution, involves only the Senate and the executive. See GETCf-Is Er AL., supra note
50, at 179.
Historian John R. Wunder disputes this account. He maintains that Congress's turnaround was
precipitated by the great Sioux leader Red Cloud's initial refusal to sign the Treaty of Fort
Laramie. He signed only after extracting further governmental concessions. While Wunder's
account is not clearly developed, his point appears to be that the United States lost faith (or
patience) in the diplomatic process and turned instead to the unilateral process afforded by
agmeements. See WUNDER, supra note 23, at 30-31.
52. PRUCHA, supra note 7, at 211.
53. Id.; see also Hoxie, supra note 32, at 205-28.
54. ld. at 205-06.
55. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
56. PRUCHA, supra note 7, at 226.
57. VINE DELORIA & CLIFFORD LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 11 (1983).
58. WUNDER, supra note 23, at 34-36.
59. PRUCHA, supra note 7, at 227.
60. WILKINSON, supra note 28, at 20. The Supreme Court upheld the allotment process in
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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Allotment was not repudiated as federal policy until 1934, when Congress
passed the Indian Reorganization Act.' Regarding Indian lands, the IRA
prohibited future allotments, extended trust periods and restrictions on Indian
lands indefinitely, and created a mechanism to restore unallotted lands to the
tribe. Most significant for our purposes, the IRA did not affect the land rights
of non-Indians who were then permanent reservation residents. The IRA's other
principal feature was provision for tribes to reconstitute themselves politically
as governments following IRA requirements. 6 This provision confirmed the
notion of inherent tribal powers.' Regarding ideology, the IRA reflected the
biases of its architect, John Collier, who stressed "group self-determination and
the preservation and restoration of Indian culture."' It is important to note
that some traditional Indian leaders objected to the IRA's standardized
procedures for organizing politically, viewing the procedures "as simply
another means of imposing white institutions on the tribes."'
Two other major shifts in federal Indian policy have occurred since 1934:
the "Termination and Relocation" policies of the 1950s and the policy of tribal
self-determination ushered in during the early 1970s, the predominant federal
policy today. These two policy eras merit fuller attention than can or should
be devoted in this brief overview. For present purposes, this article will discuss
the most pertinent aspects of each.
Termination described the result of the federal government's severing of its
political relationship with and legal obligations to tribes. The ideological
impulse driving this policy was very much in accord with that of the Allotment
era - a humanitarian, emancipating ethic toward the Indians. From this
ideological vantage, United States Indian policy had taken an unnecessary
detour with the IRA policies and was now on track with longer-standing
federal policy. Collier's crusade, in Prucha's terms, was "looked upon by many
as an aberration."'67 For those tribes that were in fact terminated, the results
were devastating, particularly the erosion of land and natural resources. 6
The Relocation program instituted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the
early 1950s contributed to a demographic shift of the Indian population from
rural/reservation lands to urban areas. Thornton estimates about 100,000
American Indians relocated to urban areas as a direct result of this program.'
61. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1988).
62. See id. § 476.
63. Id. § 476(e) ("In addition to all powers vested in any tribe or tribal council by existing
law .... " (emphasis added)); see DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 57, at 14.
64. PRUCHA, supra note 7, at 340.
65. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 57, at 15.
66. PRUCHA, supra note 7, at 340.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 348-51.
69. RUssEL THORNTON, AMERICAN INDIAN HOLOCAUST AND SURVIVAL: A POPULATION
HISTORY SINCE 1492, at 228-29 (1987).
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His study also notes American Indians did not necessarily stay in the urban
centers, and many returned to their reservations."
The policy of self-determination represents the last - and, to date, final -
significant ideological shift in federal Indian policy. It originated in the early
days of the Kennedy administration.7! ' This policy, like that of the IRA,
supports the concept of tribal self-governance, seeks to restore and rehabilitate
the devastated tribal land bases, provides stimulus to tribal economic
development, and supports tribal efforts to strengthen and/or restore significant
cultural elements (e.g., languages, religion).' Most importantly, and for the
first time, tribes were involved in designing much of the legislation coming out
of Washington. Since 1975, Congress has enacted a plethora of statutes
supporting tribal self-determination."
A few observations should be noted before we leave this section. First,
anticipating the next section on jurisprudence, we can ask to what extent
federal Indian law incorporates or captures the complex historical portrait
developed above. How do courts reconcile contemporary legal issues that may,
and usually do, originate from vastly different historical and legal periods?
Vine Deloria, Jr., offers a fairly bleak assessment:
Very few doctrines of present federal Indian law are capable of
explaining what the United States did, whether or not it was legal
in the sense that governments must bind themselves to certain
principles of law, and what the Indians did or felt in response to
70. The evidence suggests a wide range in return rates from 30% to 70%. Id. at 230.
Thornton presents the results of studies on the characteristics of American Indians who remained
in the city and those who returned. "Returnees" were likely to have less formal education, possess
a relatively high quantum of Indian-blood and self-identify more strongly as American Indian
when compared to Indians who remained in cities. Id. For interesting personal accounts of the
relocation experience, see INDIAN SELF-RuLE: FIRST-HAND AccouNTs OF INDIAN-WHITE
RELATIONS FROM ROOSsvELT TO REAGAN 161-73 (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1986).
A major figure in the design and implementation of the relocation program was Dillon S.
Myer, former Commissioner of Indian Affairs in the Truman Administration. Myer had
previously directed the government's relocation of Japanese-American citizens to internment
camps, called "relocation centers." ld. at 164. Philleo Nash succeeded Myer as Commissioner
and his criticism of the program included the following:
We were bound by the great American liberal value of non-segregation. Relocated
Indians were scattered throughout the cities so they could not form neighborhood
cohorts. This made little sense. Every ethnic group that established itself in
America did so by creating cohesive neighborhoods that generated their own
support. But the Indian Bureau could not follow this practice. This would be
practicing segregation.
Id. at 168. In context, it appears this policy was the product of internal departmental practice, not
external legal constraints. Cf. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
71. PRIJCHA, supra note 7, at 357-58.
72. Id. at 357-80.
73. See supra note 17 (listing some of the major legislation).
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the government overtures. Indeed, what is missing in federal
Indian law are the Indians.74
Second, were the ideologies manifested in the shifting government policies
(i.e., the ideologies of assimilation and of separatism) actually competing
ideologies? The question is relevant in helping to determine if the historical
record actually supports an ideology of cultural relativism. Professor White, in
his work on the Marshall Court, argues that the ideologies were not competing,
but rather were two sides of the same coin. He explains:
[T]hey both started with the assumption that Indians were
different (primitive, childlike, savage) and that their differentness
could not be tolerated. While the positions provoked sharp
differences of policy and .... precipitated conflict in the Court's
Indian cases, they functioned to exclude from discourse a third
ideological point of view, that of cultural relativism. The idea that
Indians in America should be allowed to perpetuate a radically
different cultural heritage from that of white settlers, and at the
same time be treated as human beings having natural rights to
autonomy and respect, was not seriously entertained at the time of
the Marshall Court. Only a diluted version of that idea was
entertained, manifested in the theory that Indian tribes were wards
of the federal government and should, because of their cultural
differentness, be forcibly separated from white society. That theory
was subsequently to provide the principal justification for the
establishment of federal Indian reservations, which began in
earnest in the 1860s.!'
If Professor White is correct,76 then we would proceed logically to some
later historical period that manifested an ideology supportive of cultural
relativism. The 1930s Indian Reorganization Act era and the current self-
determination policy offer possibilities. But if contemporary tribal claims
predate those eras, as many of them do, how should the modern Court resolve
the claim? Which "policy period" should predominate? The answers to these
questions bear directly on the Court's development and continued reliance on
74. Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the Content
and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIz. L. REv. 203, 205 (1989).
75. WHITE, supra note 30, at 706.
76. 1 assume arguendo that he is correct, although the historical evidence presented above,
particularly the official administration positions of Presidents Monroe and Adams as discussed
in Professor Burke's work, suggests he may be wrong. In addition, it is important to note that no
matter what the federal government thought or expected would happen to Indians, Indian people
viewed themselves as separate, distinct and enduring. The important work of historians like
Michael Green, Theda Perdue, and others is helping to document - i.e., "prove" - what
traditional tribal oral histories have been suggesting all along.
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the implicit divestiture theory to help resolve present-day assertions of tribal
authority. We turn now to consider that development.
II. Development and Critique of the Implicit Divestiture Theory
A. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
Until 1978, the prevailing legal formulation of inherent tribal powers was:
An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers
of any sovereign State . . . .These powers are subject to be
qualified by treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but
save as thus expressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty
are vested in Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs of
government.'
This formulation is consistent with the historical record developed in part
I. Treaty making was the hallmark of federal Indian policy until 1871. After
that point, Congress legislated matters in Indian affairs but maintained bilateral
relations with tribes through agreements. Tribal powers of self-governance
could thus be restricted in only two ways: bilaterally (through treaties or
agreements) or unilaterally (through the exercise of Congress's constitutional
authority in Indian matters). The Supreme Court recognized in 1896 that tribal
powers of self-governance were not limited by the federal Constitution.7
Congress changed this in 1968 through the Indian Civil Rights Act, imposing
most, but not all, of the Bill of Rights on tribes.'
In 1978, the Supreme Court decided Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.'
The question presented was whether the tribe retained inherent criminal
authority to prosecute a non-Indian reservation resident for reservation-based
crimes." The Court, speaking through then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, held
in the negative. While the Court devoted over sixteen pages to a review of
treaties, statutes, attorney general opinions, and some case law (a review that
has been sharply criticized by other scholars),' it could not find clear and
77. Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 22 (1934).
78. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
79. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988).
80. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
81. Oliphant got into federal court through the habeas corpus provisions of the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1303 (1988).
82. See Russel Barsh & James Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REv. 609, 637 (1979) (describing the opinion as the
"product of distortion, unreason, or sloppiness"); Richard B. Collins, Implied Limitations on the
Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WASH. L. REv. 479, 528-29 (1979) (stating that the marshaling
and use of precedents is "selective and at times inaccurate and misleading," but less critical
overall of Oliphant's reasoning); Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole Is
Greater Than the Sum of the Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391, 396 (1993) (stating that the court's
justification for its result is "reprehensible"). Maxfield is the harshest critic of the Oliphant court.
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express congressional authority delimiting tribal criminal jurisdiction. In fact,
a close reading of the treaties and statutes from the eighteenth century does
suggest that tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, particularly those who
intruded upon tribal lands, was widely exercised and recognized.' Indeed,
Rehnquist conceded that "[b]y themselves, these treaty provisions would
probably not be sufficient to remove criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians if
the Tribe otherwise retained such jurisdiction.' According to then-prevailing
notions of tribal sovereignty, the inquiry should have ended there; retained
tribal authority should have been presumed. Instead, Rehnquist proceeded to
announce the following unprecedented rule:
But the tribes' retained powers are not such that they are limited
only by specific restrictions in treaties or congressional enactments.
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized, Indian tribes are
prohibited from exercising both those powers of autonomous states
that are expressly terminated by Congress and those powers
"inconsistent with their status.
''5
In his conclusion, he states,
If a student in the classroom or a lawyer in court drew false inferences,
misrepresented or distorted case holdings and other legal authorities, and generally
argued based on unsubstantiated statements, what would be the appropriate
response? Would our system, so resilient and yet so fragile, survive this practice
on a widespread scale? What if the example for this practice is the United States
Supreme Court?
Id. at 443.
83. See, e.g., Barsh & Henderson, supra note 82, at 617-19. These authors point to
Rehnquist's general characterization of Indian treaties as "typically" expressing the view that tribes
lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. They write,
It is readily apparent, however, that there is no "typical" arrangement for nontribal
criminal jurisdiction. The quoted language, for example, appears in only one treaty
.* . . If Justice Rehnquist meant to imply that tribes "typically" gave up
jurisdiction over "injuries" committed by non-Indians, the implication is clearly
false. Moreover, the language quoted, even if representative of most treaties, is
just as consistent with concurrent tribal and federal criminal jurisdiction; it does
not say United States citizens shall only be punished according to the laws of the
United States.
Id.; see also Collins, supra note 82, at 506 ("Mhe tribes had no authority to punish non-Indians
lawfully present in tribal territory under federal authority and protection, jurisdiction over non-
Indian members of tribal societies was extensively exercised by Indian Territory tribes, and the
status of intruders was uncertain except under a few treaties."). Finally, it should be noted that
the Courts analysis throughout the opinion was almost entirely grounded on nineteenth century
precedents. See Williams, supra note 3, at 273 n.202 ("One would be hard pressed to find a
contemporary Supreme Court opinion which relies so exclusively on as many 19th century
precedents as Oliphant does.").
84. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208.
85. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit's opinion is the only authority Rehnquist cites for this
proposition. Of course, the irony is that the Ninth Circuit found the Suquamish
retained tribal criminal jurisdiction over Oliphant. That court treated Oliphant's
case as an Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) case. Oliphant argued he could not
get a fair trial in tribal court because non-Indians were excluded from jury
serice. The Court responded, "This issue is raised prematurely. Oliphant is
entitled to a fair trial; if he should be denied one, appeal from a conviction or
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, would then be appropriate. Further
discussion of this contention is unnecessary. '' 6
-[t is worth examining exactly what the Ninth Circuit was talking about in
the section cited by Rehnquist. The full paragraph states:
Oliphant argues that the Suquamish have no jurisdiction over
non-Indians because Congress never conferred such jurisdiction on
them. This misstates the problem. The proper approach to the
question of tribal criminal jurisdiction is to ask "first, what the
original sovereign powers of the tribes were, and, then, how far
and in what respects these powers have been limited." Powers of
Indian Tribes, 1934, 55 I.D. 14, 57 . . . It must always be
remembered that the various Indian tribes were once independent
and sovereign nations... who, though conquered and dependent,
retain those powers of autonomous states that are neither
inconsistent with their status nor expressly terminated by
Congress.87
The portions of Worcester and Cherokee Nation cited by the Ninth Circuit
clearly reference international law principles that sanctioned the type of
political arrangement existing between tribes and the United States and required
that the international community respect that arrangement.88 The nature of the
86. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 1976).
87. Id. at 1009 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831)).
88. In Cherokee Nation, the Court stated in relevant portion:
[Indians] and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by
ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the
United States, that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political
connection with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory,
and an act of hostility.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831). In a similar vein, the Court in
Worcester stated:
The very fact of repeated treaties with them recognizes, and the settled doctrine
of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence
- its right to self government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its
protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under
the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of
government, and ceasing to be a state.
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political arrangement between tribes and the federal government was such that
tribes could no longer cede lands to foreign governments or otherwise transact
as sovereign to sovereign - except, of course, with the United States
government. Legal discourse across international channels was the prerogative
of the "stronger power" of the United States. But nothing in these passages
suggests that the tribal-federal political arrangement in itself provoked a
diminution of inherent tribal powers. Indeed, Worcester's statement not only
confirms these inherent powers but establishes the federal obligation to protect
it.
After the citations to Worcester and Cherokee Nation, the Ninth Circuit
continued:
Surely the power to preserve order on the reservation, when
necessary by punishing those who violate tribal law, is a sine qua
non of the sovereignty that the Suquamish originally possessed. As
the Eighth Circuit held seven decades ago when it upheld the right
of the Creek Nation to tax non-Indian residents:
It was one of the inherent and essential attributes of its
original sovereignty. It was a natural right of that people,
indispensable to its autonomy as a distinct tribe or nation,
and it must remain an attribute of its government until by the
agreement of the nation itself or by the superior power of the
republic it is taken from it.
We turn to the relevant treaties and Congressional acts to see
whether any has withdrawn from Suquamish the power to punish
Oliphant for a violation of the tribal law and order code. Our
approach is influenced by the long-standing rule that "legislation
affecting the Indians is to be construed in their interest.""
In summary, the Ninth Circuit's discussion manifests a strongly solicitous
view of tribal powers that were not only confirmed by the United States but
guaranteed by it. The Ninth Circuit makes clear that only Congress can
diminish tribal powers either through bilateral arrangements with tribes or
unilateral acts pursuant to its plenary authority. Finally, the court establishes
that the tribal-federal political arrangement precipitated no "internal" diminution
of tribal powers but only restrained tribes in "external" dealings with foreign
nations.
Rehnquist extracts from the Ninth Circuit's opinion, and by extension, from
the jurisprudence of John Marshall, a rule of law that tribal powers may be
divested in three ways - by treaties, by express statutory acts, and now, by
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 560-61 (1832).
89. Oliphant, 544 F.2d at 1009-10 (quoting Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir.
1905)) (citations omitted).
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virtue of tribal "status." The exegesis developed above suggests Rehnquist and
his brethren in the majority were seriously mistaken.
Following the "inconsistent with their status" language, Rehnquist goes on
to develop his argument, but in a substantially different direction. He writes:
Indian reservations are "a part of the territory of the United
States." Indian tribes "hold and occupy [the reservations] with the
assent of the United States, and under their authority." Upon
incorporation into the territory of the United States, the Indian
tribes thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of the United
States and their exercise of separate power is constrained so as not
to conflict with the interests of this overriding sovereignty.
"[Their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations,
[are] necessarily diminished."'
Three observations are in order. First, Rehnquist in no place defines what
he means by "upon incorporation." Professor Milner Ball has already subjected
this concept to rigorous scrutiny and concluded that "[t]he phrase is a
performative utterance. The only evidence of the incorporation of Indian
nations known to me is located in those words. I can discover no incorporating
event or series of events outside them.""' Professor Ball also notes that the
citation to Johnson is odd, because in that decision John Marshall "specifically
allowed for the incorporation of non-Indians into the tribes and specifically
rejected the notion that tribes had been or could be incorporated into the United
States. ' g
Rehnquist may have relied on the specific concept of incorporation for
another reason. Early Supreme Court case law recognized that full
constitutional safeguards may not apply when Congress enacts laws to govern
territories or other federal property. 3 However, when territories are
"incorporated" as part of the United States, all constitutional restraints are
applicable.' In light of the extraordinarily broad license the Court had
90. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209 (quoting United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572
(1846); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823)) (citations omitted).
91. Ball, supra note 5, at 37.
92. Id. at 38-39 n.171.
93. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1957). Congressional authority over territories
is provided in U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any
Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.").
94. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 13 n.26 (1957). The Court cites Rassmussen v. United
States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905), for this proposition. A principal issue in Rassmussen was whether
Congress was bound by the Sixth Amendment jury provisions in legislating for Alaska. That
issue, the Court said, required it "to determine whether Alaska has been incorporated into the
United States as a part thereof, or is simply held.., under the sovereignty of the United States
as a possession or dependency." Id. at 520-21.
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afforded Congress in setting Indian policy," the Court may have wanted to
leave no doubt that congressional authority was restrained even in Indian
affairs, at least in some circumstances. Invoking this jurisprudence of
"incorporation" provided that assurance, even if the Court could point to no
actual or historical incorporation of tribes within the United States."
Second, the passage cited from Johnson v. M'Intosh,' read in context,
discusses the legal fiction of the "discovery doctrine," which bestowed
"exclusive" title to whichever European potentate landed first. It was a rule of
"first thou" that gave "to the nation making the discovery the sole right of
acquiring the soil from the natives .. . . [l]t was a right with which no
Europeans could interfere."" Marshall's interpretation of the discovery
doctrine at best supports a negative limitation on tribal powers. Tribes could
not cede lands to another European power because of the necessary but
fictitious constraints imposed by an external ordering system, a system that
bound Europeans not to interfere with indigenous people once a fellow Western
nation had claimed their land. Marshall in no place indicates that this limitation
on tribal power stemmed from qualities or characteristics inherent to tribes. In
fact, he could not have.
Finally, Rehnquist indicates that tribal powers are "constrained" so as not
to conflict with the "interests" of the overriding sovereignty. He identifies two
such overriding interests. One is the interest of the United States in protecting
its territorial boundaries.' This interest is consistent with earlier
pronouncements from the Marshall Court; tribes could not transgress into areas
that were exclusively within the external sovereign prerogative. These
prerogatives included federal land cessions and treaties with foreign countries.
Recall, however, that such constraints on tribal powers resulted from the
political arrangement between tribes and the federal government, not from any
inherent limitations.
The other interest is individual liberty. Rehnquist notes that
from the formation of the Union and the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, the United States has manifested an equally great solicitude
that its citizens be protected by the United States from unwarranted
intrusions on their personal liberty. The power of the United States
to try and criminally punish is an important manifestation of the
power to restrict personal liberty. By submitting to the overriding
95. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553 (1903).
96. This line of reasoning was pursued by the court in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990),
where the Court held that tribes were implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians. Id. at 693-94.
97. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
98. Id. at 574.
99. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209-10 (1978).
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1994
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily
give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States
except in a manner acceptable to Congress. This principle would
have been obvious a century ago when most Indian tribes were
characterized by a ."want of fixed laws [and] of competent tribunals
of justice." It should be no less obvious today, even though
present-day Indian tribal courts embody dramatic advances over
their historical antecedents."a1
Rehnquist's individual liberty analysis examines two nineteenth century
judicial precedents, Ex parte Crow Dog' and United States v. Kagama,"'
and an eighteenth century statute, the 1790 Trade and Intercourse Act."H
Since the individual liberty thesis may constitute the only legitimate legal point
of contention in Oliphant, it is worth examining this argument and its
underlying basis more closely.
The Nonintercourse Act is cited for the proposition that tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians was somehow preempted. Professor Maxfield
notes that the statute contains language similar to some of the early treaties that
in fact recognized tribal criminal authority over non-Indians. At best, Maxfield
argues, the cited statute militates a finding of concurrent, but not exclusive,
federal jurisdiction."
The case of Ex parte Crow Dog involved the murder of a Brule Sioux chief
by a fellow tribal member within the reservation. The respective families met
and resolved the matter according to tribal law. 5 Crow Dog was
subsequently tried in United States territorial court, found guilty, and sentenced
to hang. On appeal, the Supreme Court found exclusive jurisdiction in the tribe
and reversed the conviction due in large part to the "nature and circumstances
of the case."'' The Court essentially found that it would be unfair to try
Crow Dog according to external laws, "of which [he had] an imperfect
conception" and a standard of morality, "which measures the red man's revenge
by the maxims of the white man's morality."'" For Rehnquist, Oliphant's
100. Id. at 210 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1834)) (citation
omitted).
101. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
102. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
103. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137.
104. Maxfield, supra note 82, at 418-19; see also Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 198 n.8.
105. The settlement required Kan-gi-shun-ca (Crow Dog) and/or his clan to pay $600 in
cash, eight horses, and one blanket to the family of the decedent, Sin-ta-ga-le-Scka. SIDNEY L.
HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW AND UNITED
STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 1 (1994).
tO. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571.
107. ld. Rehnquist's quote from Crow Dog "sanitizes" the earlier opinion by removing its
references to "savage life," "superiors of a different race," and "savage nature." Compare Crow
Dog, 109 U.S. at 571 with Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210-11.
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situation presented "almost the inverse""' of Crow Dog's situation.
Considerations of fairness precluded federal jurisdiction in Crow Dog and
"speak equally strongly against" retained tribal authority in Oliphant. 9 The
syllogism, of course, does not withstand close scrutiny.
First, Crow Dog's case involved a purely intratribal affair while Oliphant's
case involved an Indian and non-Indian encounter. Second, it is disingenuous
to suggest that Oliphant had "an imperfect conception" of laws against
assaulting a police officer (any police officer) and resisting arrest. And third,
that Rehnquist would almost equate the power the Suquamish held over
Oliphant with the power the federal courts held over Crow Dog is a cause for
mild celebration. In reality, the courts exercised vastly different powers. Crow
Dog, after all, was sentenced to hang; Oliphant, at worst, would have gotten
a cot in the tribal jail for a few days and/or a fine."'
United States v. Kagama, on facts nearly identical to Crow Dog's case,
involved a challenge to the federal Major Crimes Act,"' passed in June 1885,
one and one-half years after Crow Dog's conviction was overturned."' The
Act authorized federal prosecution of certain enumerated crimes, including
murder, when committed by Indians within Indian lands. The Supreme Court
upheld the law, not on grounds that the statute was authorized pursuant to
Congress's Article I powers in Indian affairs,"' but on the basis of Congress's
presumed plenary power in Indian affairs. The Court did not, and indeed could
not, cite textual authority from the Constitution to support this theory of
congressional power in Indian affairs. Congress's authority to legislate a
criminal code for tribes apparently stemmed from its role as tribal guardian.
The Kagama Court opined:
It seems to us that this is within the competency of Congress.
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are
communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely
for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe
108. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
109. Id. at211.
110. At the time of Oliphant's offense, the Indian Civil Rights Act prescribed maximum
penalties of $500 fine or a term not greater than six months in prison. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7)
(1988).
Ill. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
112. Harting demonstrates that the federal statute was not necessarily a visceral political
reaction to the "public outcry" which followed Crow Dog's case. HARRING, supra note 105, at
134. In fact, the Bureau of Indian Affairs had been lobbying Congress for just such a statute
since 1874. Kaganta, the first legal challenge to the new statute, was decided less than a year
after the Act's passage and a mere nine months before the Dawes Act of 1887. Id. at 142 n.3.
113. The Court refused to consider the imposition of a system of criminal laws for Indians
to be encompassed within the clause authorizing Congress to "regulate Commerce... with the
Indian Tribes." This represented a "very strained construction of this clause." United States v.
Kagama, I18 U.S. 375, 378 (1886).
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no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection.
Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they
are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing
of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it
has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it
the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and
by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has
arisen."4
When viewed in context with prevailing federal Indian policy during the
late-nineteenth century, it is clear that the Supreme Court in Kagama was
reconciling, indeed, restructuring its jurisprudential view of tribal-federal
political relations to resonate harmoniously with extant congressional policy.
Professor Harring characterizes Kagama as "the judicial embodiment of
Congress's policy of forcing the assimilation of the tribes, recognizing none of
their sovereignty, none of their status as domestic nations. '
It is noteworthy that Rehnquist does not cite the passage in Kagama
recognizing federal authority but instead cites the portion of Kagama's dicta
that found only two "legitimate" sovereign powers operating within the
American federalist structure. The modem Court, generally, has tried to
distance itself from reliance on plenary power as a legitimating source of
federal authority in Indian affairs, 6 though its efforts have not always been
consistent or complete."' Kagama departs from Marshall's conceptualization
of tribal sovereignty by offering a different vision, one that views tribal
sovereignty existing as a gesture of federal grace, not legal entitlement. Classic
republicanism (what Robert Clinton calls a form of "trust us" political
114. Id. at 383-84.
115. HARRING, supra note 105, at 142. He adds,
[Bloth the Major Crimes Act and the Kagama decision occurred directly in the
midst of Congress' most sweeping debate on Indian policy, a policy that led to the
Dawes Act of February 8, 1887, providing for the forced allotment of Indian lands
as a deliberate means of destroying "communistic" tribal culture and forcing the
Indians to assimilate as farmers and ranchers into the mainstream of U.S. life.
Id. at 143.
116. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). "The source
of federal authority over Indian matters has been the subject of some confusion, but it is now
generally recognized that the power derives from federal responsibility for regulating commerce
with Indian tribes and for treaty making." Id. at 172 n.7 (citing U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; id.
art. II, § 2, cI. 2).
117. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). "When Congress acts
with respect to the Indian tribes, it generally does so pursuant to its authority under the Indian
Commerce Clause, or by virtue of its superior position over the tribes." Id. at 155 n.21.
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constraint..) replaced legal mechanisms as the prime source of protection for
tribal autonomy.
It should not be surprising that a judicial reformulation of tribal powers
would have occurred during this time, considering Congress's overhaul of the
tribal-federal relationship. What is surprising is that while Congress has since
returned to a policy strongly supportive of inherent tribal power, Kagama's
judicial conceptualization both of tribal powers and of virtually unlimited
federal authority in Indian affairs has persisted. The competing views of tribal
powers present serious challenges to contemporary jurists. Should a jurist
accept Marshall's concept of tribes as nations or Kagama's concept of tribes
"not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of
sovereignty, but as a separate people"?"' To give full force to the Marshall
theory in present-day affairs would be, in effect, to recognize a species of
political autonomy in tribes that takes no account of the dramatic intervening
historical, social, and political forces that produced today's complex reservation
communities. However, to give full force to the Kagama theory would
effectively ignore the long-standing policies of tribal-federal bilateralism that
preceded Allotment and the policies of self-determination that ultimately
prevailed in the Allotment era."
Mark Oliphant's challenge to the Suquamish Tribal Court's criminal
authority required an intellectual "unpacking" of crates of historical, legal,
political, and social materials. The crate marked "Worcester v. Georgia, "while
it may have been wheeled into the examining room, evidently was not opened.
Its absence in the Oliphant opinion is conspicuous and noteworthy. What
explains this omission? The facts of Oliphant may provide the best clue.
The Suquamish occupy a reservation of over seven thousand acres in
northwestern Washington state. The majority of this acreage is owned in fee
simple by non-Indian residents who outnumber Suquamish residents by a ratio
of nearly sixty to one.' Non-Indian reservation residents derived their title
through policies that grew out of the Allotment Act.
The specter of fifty reservation tribal members exercising criminal authority
over nearly three thousand non-Indian reservation residents must have struck
the Court as so profoundly discordant with fair processes that it justified the
118. Robert N. Clinton, Peyote and Judicial Political Activism, Neo-colonialism and the
Supreme Court's New Indian Law Agenda, 38 FED. BAR NEws & J. 92, 93 (1991).
119. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886).
120. See WILKINSON, supra note 28, at 25-31.
121. The Court notes that 63% of the 7000-plus acres is owned in fee simple by non-Indians
while the other 37% is Indian-owned lands held in trust by the United States. Nearly 3000 non-
Indians reside on the reservations while only 50 tribal members reside there. Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 n.1 (1978).
122. The Suquamish did not consent to non-Indian homesteading of surplus lands. Non-
Indians acquired title through sales of Indian allotments which were authorized by other
Allotment Era provisions and implemented by the Secretary of the Interior. Id.
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wholesale creation of a limiting theory of tribal jurisdiction. Treaties, statutes,
and other positive expressions of law did not offer sufficient justification to do
this, so the Court resorted to what we might term "legal imagism." Two
visions were created, juxtaposed against each another and presented as
irreconcilable, thereby necessitating the extinction of one vision. What were
these two constructed images?
The first is an atavistic conceptualization of tribal authority, particularly over
non-Indians. The Western genre and notions of frontier justice were revitalized
in Oliphant to create an image of Indians and whites still battling over precious
lands, where Indians' savage nature (Crow Dog) still awaits the tempering and
benevolent influences of an understanding yet firm paternal white figure (Judge
Isaac Parker) and where the Indian polity is already firmly dominated, if not
completely superseded, by a superior power (Kagama). References to
"increasingly sophisticated" tribal court systems are insufficient to eradicate the
"dangers" awaiting non-Indians if brought before tribal forums.I" Oliphant's
vision of justice in tribal courts for non-Indians is the judicial analogue to the
American literary genre of captivity narratives."
This image necessarily entails privileging the historical record and the
federal policies of another era. The last section raised this concern as one of
the most significant juridical issues confronting today's courts. For tribal legal
advocates, the important question lies in how best to present the full record of
a matter and reduce the risk that a subsequent court will choose to effectuate
the policies of another era to the tribe's detriment."
The second image is that of an American political and legal apparatus that
greatly values individual liberty and constrains government action that restricts
individual liberty unless clearly warranted. Even then, government processes
must accord "basic procedural rights" to the individual before liberty can be
limited." This image is incomplete. It furthers the impression that federal
and state polities - the only two legitimate bodies within "the broad domain
of sovereignty" - both extend "equally great solicitude" to citizens' liberty
interests. As Professor Newton demonstrates, this view distorts a significant
portion of American constitutional history. While the Fourteenth Amendment
123. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211-12.
124. See, e.g., COLIN G. CALLOWAY, NORTH COUNTRY CAPTIVES (1992). "Pioneers on the
American frontier commonly viewed the prospect of being taken captive by Indians as a fate
worse than death. The narratives recorded by redeemed captives represent one of the oldest
genres of American literature, and they helped to establish enduring stereotypes of Indians as
cruel and bloodthirsty." Id. at vii; see also JOHN TANNER, THE FALcON: A NARRATIVE OF THE
CA,'YnvrrY AND ADVENTURES OF JOHN TANNER (Viking-Penguin 1994) (1830).
125. For a recent example of the Court effectuating the policies of the Allotment Era despite
strong arguments that both the IRA and current policy mandated a contrary result, see County of
Yaldma v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
126. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.
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to the Constitution 7 imposed due process and equal protection restrictions
upon states,"z' nearly one hundred years elapsed before "the Supreme Court
determined that the concept of fundamental fairness of the Due Process Clause
incorporated certain provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states.""' In other
words, the Supreme Court began to incorporate provisions of the Bill of Rights
selectively, making them applicable to states via the Fourteenth Amendment
at about the time Congress was doing the same thing vis-h-vis the Indian tribes
through the mechanism of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).'"
As constructed by the Court, it is plain to see which vision had to yield.
The Indians, as they say, "never stood a chance." This result is anomalous
because it never addresses why non-Indians' liberty interests are privileged over
those of Indians. All Indians were granted United States citizenship in 1924"
and thus are entitled to the federal government's "great solicitude." The
difference may be, though the Court never explored it, that tribal members
participate directly in the formation of their government and thereby influence
the quality of justice administered by their courts.
This analysis perhaps should prompt us to revisit the Ninth Circuit's opinion
in Oliphant, if only to determine whether that court struggled with the difficult
policy implications underlying the case. The Ninth Circuit apparently did
confront these issues but pursued a path entirely different from that undertaken
by the Supreme Court. Upon completing its analysis of legislative enactments,
the Ninth Circuit turned to consider "whether the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction by the Suquamish in cases such as this one would interfere with or
frustrate the policies of the United States."' 2 The court found no conflict
with federal law. Indeed, it noted that the federal government "has been
encouraging Indian tribes to adopt law and order codes, set up tribal courts,
and exercise authority over reservation lands .... Tribal criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians, as limited by the Indian Bill of Rights [presumably, the
ICRA], is a small but necessary part of this policy."' 3
Compared to the Supreme Court's approach, the Ninth Circuit's analysis
defers more to congressional policy and seems to assume, though this is never
stated, that the most recent manifestation of federal Indian policy should
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (ratified July 9, 1868).
128. Scholars have questioned whether the Fourteenth Amendment was constitutionally
enacted given that representatives from southern states were excluded from that Congress. See
Judith Resnick, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHi.
L. REV. 671, 698 (1989).
129. Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 109, 120 (1992).
130. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988); see Newton, supra note 129, at 121.
131. COHEN, supra note 8, at 642-45. Some Indians acquired citizenship earlier via treaties
or statutes.
132. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 1976).
133. Id. at 1012-13 (emphasis added).
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govern. The only constraint the Ninth Circuit could find on the tribe's criminal
power over non-Indians was the ICRA.
The Ninth Circuit's inquiry into federal policies echoes that portion of the
Supreme Court's language in Oliphant stating tribal powers were constrained
so as not "to conflict with the interests of this overriding sovereignty."1'
Earlier, this author suggested that this inquiry requires a fundamentally
different approach than the Supreme Court's other formulation diminishing
tribal powers, i.e., the "inconsistent with their status" language. What is the
difference?
Inquiry into "overriding federal interests" focuses the Court's attention on
prevailing federal enactments or expressions of federal policy to determine the
scope of extant tribal powers. Under this approach, courts logically should take
the most recent articulation of federal Indian policy as governing unless they
find clear evidence to the contrary. From this perspective, treaties and treaty-
substitutes 35 serve a constitutive function to provide order and structure to the
intergovernmental relationship. Professor Frickey argues for this view, noting
that treaties (and their equivalents) are the
constitutive document[s] providing the undergirding and framework
for an ongoing (tribal) government-(federal) government
relationship. [They are] ... the joinder of two sets of "We the
People," and ... therefore [resonate] with Marbury's notion that
constitutional authority flows from the people themselves. The
treaty was a sovereign act of law rather than of sheer power -
that is, of conquest."
Inquiry into "overriding federal interests" also represents the more legitimate
interpretive role for the judiciary. Professor Martha A. Field, in arguing for a
broader judicial power to create federal common law, recognizes a significant
limitation: "[T]he court must point to a federal enactment, constitutional or
statutory, that it interprets as authorizing the federal common law rule.""'
This is particularly true for the federal judiciary owing to considerations of
federalism, separation of powers, and the nature of the federal system as a
government of limited powers.'3' Thus,
federal judges' jurisdiction is limited to what Congress has granted,
and Congress can grant only what the Constitution permits ...
Federal judges ... (or state judges faced with a federal common
134. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978).
135. This is Wilkinson's term. See WILKINSON, supra note 28, at 103.
136. Phillip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381, 409-10 (1993).
137. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 881, 887 (1986).
138. Id. at 899.
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law problem) can fill in a gap only if some enactment permits
them to do so; otherwise the area is not one for federal rule at all,
but is left to the states.
39
The Ninth Circuit's approach in Oliphant appears to fall within the parameters
delineated here. It is less clear whether the Supreme Court's approach accords
with this view.
John Marshall appreciated the conception of treaties as constitutive texts.
Far from ruling that tribal powers could be divested because of some inherent
quality, Marshall made clear that any limitation on tribal powers was a function
of the political arrangement - the constitutive alignment - with a politically
superior power. To the extent that Rehnquist's opinion in Oliphant requires
inquiry into "overriding federal interests," it appears consistent with Marshall's
theory."4
Inquiry into "inconsistent with their status," on the other hand, focuses the
Court's attention on the individual tribal legacy of self-rule. In itself, this is not
an irrelevant inquiry. Tribes evolve like all other communities; they merge,
they confederate, and they disband. Thus, the inquiry ensures that a tribal body
politic is extant with the potentiality of exercising inherent powers of self-rule.
There are dangers, however. First, the interpretive lens may selectively
incorporate an image or impression of tribalism at a given moment in time and
give that image undue prominence. Oliphant slips dangerously close to this
point when it relies on an 1834 House Report's characterization of tribes as
wanting "of fixed laws [and] of competent tribunals of justice."'' The
opinion never fully disavows itself of this image, and its influence is
palpable.'
Second, a focus on "tribal status" permits ethnocentric speculation about the
nature of legitimate political institutional systems. Oliphant references an 1834
statement from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs who noted that with few
exceptions, "the Indian tribes are without laws, and the chiefs without much
139. Id.
140. Perry Dane notes that "[slovereigns do intervene in each other's affairs, but it is the
intervention of strangers. Its source is not the simple calculus of governance, but the complicated
ethics of encounter." Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
959, 971 (1991). "[W]hen done right," he says, it is "like one person on the street stopping
another from beating her child." Id. The "dark" side is that the encounter can detach itself from
any sense of order or principle and take on the form of hate and warfare. "At its worst," he says,
"it is not like to protecting a stranger's child, but more like accosting the stranger with her child."
Id.
141. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978).
142. One thinks of Edward Curtis and his manipulation of light, setting, costuming, and
subject posing to achieve a certain image of "real Indianness." See, e.g., BARRY PRITZKER,
EDWARD S. CuRTs (1993). "[H]e believed that the supposed quality of 'Indianness' could be
enhanced in a photograph, in part by maximizing a wild setting." Id. at 99.
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aulhority to exercise any restraint." 3 As the historical section demonstrates,
evidence to the contrary exists. Moreover, this early statement reflects a
frequently encountered ethnocentric bias toward tribal political organizations
denying the legitimacy of political systems that relied on consensus, not
coercion, to regulate social relations.
Finally, a focus on "tribal status" viewed in context with the Anglo-
American legal system's reliance on precedent creates obstacles to tribes
attempting to tell their stories. Tribes frequently must deconstruct recorded
historical materials both to add their voices to the narrative and to provide
context for the recorded events. Precedent compounds this problem by imbuing
pat legal discourse with the cloak of authority. This phenomenon "allows legal
authority to appear as though it were timeless. The example from the past is
merged with a new example from the present: Linearity is redefined as
simultaneity. The past is always present in the form of the authoritative
example.'"
Rehnquist's opinion in Oliphant demonstrates how easily precedent can be
decontextualized and applied presently so as to appear timeless and hence
authoritative. The 1790 NonIntercourse statute, in relevant part, provided for
federal jurisdiction over non-Indians for offenses committed in Indian country.
Rehnquist notes that Congress "was careful to extend to the non-Indian
of fender the basic criminal rights that would attach in non-Indian related cases.
Under respondents' theory, however, Indian tribes would have been free to try
the same non-Indians without these careful proceedings unless Congress
affirmatively legislated to the contrary."'45 The "denuded" operative principle
(borrowing the term from Torres and Milun) was that Indian tribes lacked
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The principle applied in 1790 continues
to apply today because it has been established a priori as authoritative. Context
seems irrelevant.
There is also a strong moral objection to relying on tribal status. Given the
history of colonialism and federal policies aimed directly at destroying the
tribal communitarian fabric, it appears disingenuous and immoral to posit that
tribal powers no longer exist because they succumbed to debilitating and
nihilistic forces.
In summary, the reasoning in Oliphant is revealed to be fundamentally
flawed. There is no legal basis from which the Court can argue that tribal
powers are implicitly divested by virtue of their "status." The Supreme Court's
reliance on the lower court for this proposition is misguided, since the Ninth
Circuit found in favor of retained tribal power and used "status" in the
international law sense of the term, not as a free-standing theory to delimit
143. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 197.
144. Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence:
The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE Li. 625, 642.
145. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211.
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tribal powers. As used by Marshall and the Ninth Circuit, tribal status is an
inherently relational concept referring to the tribes' political relationship with
the federal government. Limitations on tribal powers resulted from that
political relationship but only to the extent the tribal activity infringed on a
matter within the federal government's sovereign domain. Until Oliphant, these
limitations consisted of transactions with foreign nations and cessions of public
lands.
Oliphant's "overriding federal interests" language might be consonant with
these earlier precedents, but the result of that inquiry would hardly produce an
"implicit" divestiture of tribal powers since evidence of overriding federal
interests would have to originate from Congress, and not be fabricated by the
Court. Oliphant's obvious concern for the protection of individual liberty rights
fails to consider that Congress may have taken that matter into account when
it passed the Indian Civil Rights Act. From this perspective, the Court's
interpretive function involved reconsidering legislative intent and reordering the
resulting political dynamic - a function outside the traditional role of the
judiciary.
The next section will examine Oliphant's legacy and the adjudicative role
of implicit divestiture.
B. Oliphant and Implicit Divestiture: The Aftermath
The Oliphant decision created jurisprudential problems in the field of federal
Indian law and practical problems for Indian tribes. From a jurisprudential
aspect, the decision upset precedent nearly one hundred and fifty years old by
prescribing a novel means to divest or diminish tribal powers.'" The power
to do so, if it existed at all, rested with Congress, not the courts. Oliphant and
its theory of implicit divestiture put the Court in a position to exercise judicial
plenary power. The theory lacks both precise definition and any perceptible
limits and can thus be asserted in a variety of contexts. This situation contrasts
markedly with the quality and quantum of proof required of Congress to show
it has acted to diminish tribal authority or rights. For example, the Court has
typically required explicit or clear evidence of congressional intent to deprive
tribes of treaty rights 47 or to diminish tribal land bases.4
146. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 451 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (1989).
147. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968) (stating that
statutes are not construed so as to abrogate treaty rights in "a backhanded way," and absent
explicit statement, Congress's intent to abrogate or modify a treaty will not be "lightly imputed").
For a subsequent Oliphant decision in accord with Menominee, see United States v. Dion, 476
U.S. 734 (1986). The Dion Court stated, "What is essential is clear evidence that Congress
actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty
rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty." Id. at 739-40
(emphasis added).
148. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975) (requiring that
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Practically, Oliphant unleashed an assault on the existence of tribal power,
mainly from non-Indian reservation residents, non-Indian business entities, or
the state.49 It also helped generate a healthy flow of Indian law cases into the
federal courts, a particularly ironic result given Chief Justice Rehnquist's active
campaign to reduce the burden on the federal judiciary.'
The jurisprudential review that follows traces the Court's implicit divestiture
theory since Oliphant. The immediate purpose is to assess whether the Court
has modified the theory since 1978 and, if so, in what circumstances. The
broader purpose is to expose the Court's underlying concerns with tribal
authority over all persons and property within reservation boundaries.
Oliphant's concern for individual liberties caused the Court to gloss over
principles of legalism and historicism to achieve the desired result. As
previously argued, the Court relied instead on legal imagism, a contrived but
clear vision of the respective interests at stake. Time-honored individual
liberties and inherent tribal sovereignty were set as oppositional forces to each
other. In choosing to promote and protect the individual liberty interests of
non-Indian reservation residents, at the expense of tribal self-government, the
Court sacrificed even larger principles of judicial integrity and restraint.
Supreme Court decisions after Oliphant continue to cite its implicit
divestiture theory but conflict over which "test" should govern its application.
connessional determination to terminate reservation lands "be expressed on the face of the Act
or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history"). For a subsequent
Oliphant decision in accord with DeCoteau, see Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984). The
Solem Court stated, "Diminishment ... will not be lightly inferred. Our analysis of surplus land
acts requires that Congress clearly evince an 'intent to change boundaries' before diminishment
will be found." Id. at 470.
149. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134 (1980); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct.
2309 (1993); Burlington N.R.R. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1991);
Burlington N.R.R. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991); FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock
Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990).
An ongoing battle on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation between the tribe and a non-
Indian liquor store owner indicates the continuing hostility and battles over jurisdiction. In City
of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 2741 (1994), the tribe imposed a $100 liquor license fee on operators of liquor stores on
the reservation. A non-Indian store owner refused to pay and challenged the tribe's authority
beginning in tribal court. After exhausting tribal appeals, he filed suit in federal district court and
ultimately got a ruling from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that the tribe had been delegated
authority by Congress to regulate liquor trade. Id. at 556. The store owner therefore owed the
$100. An appeal was recently denied by the U.S. Supreme Court. The store owner may even
mortgage other properties to pay legal expenses, all because he rejects tribal authority and refuses
to pay the $100 fee. The author thanks Professor Frank Pommersheim for the background details
on this case.
150. William Rehnquist, National Conference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships:
Welcoming Retnarkv, 78 VA. L. REv. 1657 (1992).
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For instance, in United States v. Wheeler,' the Court stated that tribes
"possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status. See Oliphant v.
Suquanish Indian Tribe."'5  In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Indian Reservation,'53 the Court flatly contradicted both Wheeler and
itself in the same opinion. In construing tribal power to tax, the Court first said
tribes retained such authority "unless divested of it by federal law or necessary
implication of their dependent status."'" The Court then relied on the "other"
Oliphant test in stating:
Tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the tribes'
dependent status. This Court has found such a divestiture in cases
where the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with
the overriding interests of the National Government, as when the
tribes seek to engage in foreign relations, alienate their lands to
non-Indians without federal consent, or prosecute non-Indians in
tribal courts which do not accord the full protection of the Bill of
Rights.
5
The Wheeler Court determined that the Navajo Nation had not been
implicitly divested of its authority to prosecute a tribal member since tribal
self-government included "the power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal
laws. '"' Non-Indians were not involved in Wheeler, but in dictum, the Court
explained that implicit divestiture had occurred in areas "involving the relations
between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe."'" The statement was
gratuitous (only a tribal member was involved), overly broad (Oliphant referred
to non-Indians that Wheeler expanded to nonmembers), and apocryphal (tribal
authority over non-Indians was explicitly recognized in Williams v. Lee). 8
151. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
152. Id. at 323 (emphasis added).
153. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
154. Id. at 152.
155. Id. at 153-54 (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210; Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326).
156. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326 (emphasis added). Defendant Wheeler was indicted for rape
by a federal grand jury. One year earlier he pled guilty in tribal court to misdemeanor charges
stemming from the same event. He interposed the Fifth Amendments double jeopardy provision
to the federal prosecution, arguing that the tribe's authority flowed from the federal government's
and therefore represented a second prosecution by the same sovereign for the same offense. The
court disagreed. Id. at 330.
157. Id. at 326.
158. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). The Court had occasion to consider whether
tribes retained criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. In Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676
(1990), the Court held that tribes had also been implicitly divested of this authority. The decision
relied heavily on the individual liberty arguments discussed in Oliphant and a dubious theory that
tribal authority rests on consent of the governed. Given the nonmember Indians' membership in
a larger political group - the United States - and their inability to participate in tribal affairs,
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Despite the Court's conflicting statements in Colville, there is no doubt
which "test" was applied in its holding; the Court found "no overriding federal
interest that would necessarily be frustrated by tribal taxation. And even if the
State's interests were implicated by the tribal taxes ... it must be remembered
that tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal
Government, not the States."'5 9 This analysis accords with Marshall's theory
that viewed tribal powers in relation to overriding federal political authority.
In the absence of any conflicting federal policies, tribal authority should be
presumed.
In the next term, the Court decided Montana v. United States."w In
applying the implicit divestiture theory, the Court not only reverted to
"dapendent status" terminology, but reworked the entire jurisdictional
framework. The issue was whether the Crow Tribe could enforce its hunting
and fishing regulations throughout the reservation, including over fee lands held
by non-Indians. Recognizing that Oliphant concerned inherent tribal authority
in criminal matters, the Court said "the principles on which [Oliphant] relied
support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian
tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe."'l' The
"principles" referred to were summarized by the Court as follows: "But
exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent
status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional
delegation."'62
Though Montana purports to restate the law regarding implicit divestiture,
in truth, the opinion actually redefines and broadens it. Wheeler's dictum, that
implicit divestiture applies in areas involving relations between tribes and
nonmembers, becomes a "general principle" with the force of law. The phrase,
"necessary to protect tribal self-government" as a basis for delimiting tribal
authority is neither defined nor suggested by the cases cited in support.'
the Court treated the nonmember Indians as non-Indians and ruled that inherent tribal criminal
authority was divested. Id. at 692-93. Duro was legislatively reversed in 1991 by act of
Congress. For comprehensive treatment of the Duro reversal legislation, see Newton, supra note
129.
159. Colville, 447 U.S.'at 154.
160. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
161. Id. at 565.
162. Id. at 564. Wheeler is cited just prior to this passage to clarify that "internal" matters
refers to relations among members of the tribe; "external" matters refers to relations with
nonmembers of the tribe. Tribal authority over the latter, according to the Court, has been
implicitly divested and requires congressionally delegated authority. Four cases are cited
immediately after this passage, three of which deal with questions of state authority in or arising
from Indian country. They are thus inapposite for the proposition stated. The fourth, Kagama,
was extensively reviewed earlier and much of that analysis applies here. It bears restating that
Kagama's reasoning coincided with prevailing congressional efforts to eradicate tribalism. See
supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
163. As a sop to retained tribal jurisdiction, the Court recognizes two instances where tribal
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It is unclear why a case involving tribal hunting and fishing regulation
would inspire the Court not only to perpetuate the Oliphant theory but actually
to expand it. The Court fails to explain exactly why "tribal status" necessarily
entails a divestment of tribal regulatory authority. It was sufficient that the
tribe attempted to regulate the conduct of nonmembers on their fee lands, and,
absent consensual arrangements with them or proof that their conduct impacted
negatively on the tribal community, this authority would have to come from
Congress."
It is significant that only ten months later, Montana was not cited at all in
a case questioning tribal authority to tax non-Indian commercial interests on
reservations. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,"r the Court upheld tribal
authority to tax non-Indians as part of its "inherent power necessary to tribal
self-government and territorial management."'" This power exists
notwithstanding the fact that fee title to lands is held by non-Indians. The
Court stated,
[N]either the United States, nor a state, nor any other sovereignty
loses the power to govern the people within its borders by the
existence of towns and cities therein endowed with the usual
civil authority over non-Indians may still apply, even on fee lands: (I) where the nonmember has
entered into "consensual relationships" with the tribe, or (2) where the nonmember's conduct
"threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health
or welfare of the tribe." Id. at 565-66. The Court's opinion in Colville is cited as an example of
the former. Id. at 566. The latter prong finds an interesting parallel in a federalism case decided
the same term. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981),
the Court found that the Tenth Amendment protected state sovereignty when federal laws
"directly impair [states'] ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions."
Id. at 274 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976)). National
League was overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
Garcia found the political processes inherent in the structure of the federal government afforded
the best protection to states. The Court could not "single out particular features of a State's
internal governance that are deemed to be intrinsic parts of state sovereignty." Id. at 548.
Montana's "tests" for when tribal authority may be exerted over non-Indians on fee lands are as
nebulous as the standards ultimately rejected in Garcia. Further, unlike states, tribes lack political
protection inherent in the federal structure. Their authority therefore remains vulnerable to the
vicissitudinous rulemaking of the Court. See Ball, supra note 5, at 93-94 n.454.
164. The history of the Allotment Act was key to the Court's analysis that Crow treaty rights
had been abrogated. The Court forthrightly acknowledged that congressional policy was geared
toward dissolving reservations and tribal governments. From this perspective, the Court found
it incomprehensible that Congress would expect or desire that tribes exert any governmental
authority over non-Indian landowners within the reservations. The expectations of landowners
also weighed in the Court's consideration. The point is that the Court's discussion of inherent
tribal authority - separate from the asserted treaty right - was strongly influenced by this
historical legacy. As with Oliphant itself, the Montana opinion privileges a particular period of
federal Indian policy and accords it determinative weight, despite subsequent congressional
repudiation of the earlier policy.
165. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
166. Id. at 141.
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powers of municipalities, nor by the ownership nor occupancy of
the land within its territorial jurisdiction by citizens or
foreigners.67
The Court continued to struggle with implicit divestiture in a case
challenging the tribe's authority to zone lands owned in fee by non-Indians
within the reservation. In the badly fractured decision in Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,"6 a plurality
held that the tribe had been implicitly divested of its authority to zone fee lands
held by non-Indians in reservation areas where the predominant landowners are
non-Indians. Tribal zoning authority over fee lands owned by non-Indians was
retained in reservation areas predominantly held under trust by the federal
government. Justice White's opinion, which found implicit divestiture to have
occurred at least in part of the reservation, recited the "dependent status"
language but clearly based the finding of divestiture on the fact that the tribe
attempted to regulate nonmembers: "[R]egulation of 'the relations between an
Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe' is necessarily inconsistent with a
tribe's dependent status, and therefore tribal sovereignty over such matters of
'external relations' is divested."'' Justice White also indicated that the "list"
of areas where tribal powers have been found implicitly divested "is by no
means exclusive." 7"
Justice Blackmun's opinion, which disagreed that tribal powers had been
divested at all, is notable for several reasons. First, it recalls Marshall's view
that the only tribal powers lost by virtue of "dependent status" were those
"inherently inconsistent with the paramount authority of the United States."'
7
'
Second, it refutes Montana's "general principle" that presumptively denies tribal
authority over nonmembers absent congressional delegation. Indeed, Blackmun
says, one hundred and fifty years ofjurisprudence involving Indians establishes
a very different "'general principle' governing inherent tribal sovereignty - a
principle according to which tribes retain their sovereign powers over non-
Indians on reservation lands unless the exercise of that sovereignty would be
'inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National Government."
'
"n
Third, he notes the critical role zoning plays in local governments' ability to
"engage in the systematic and coordinated utilization of land that is the very
essence of zoning authority."" For Blackmun, upholding tribal authority in
167. Id. at 143.
168. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
169. Id. at 427.
170. Id. at 426.
171. Id. at 451.
172. ld. at 450.
173. Id. at458 (citing NORMAN WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 1.08(1988)).
The result in Brendale leads precisely to the sort of "checkerboard" jurisdiction which the Court
hr.d earlier declared anathema to effective reservation management. See Seymour v.
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this context would fulfill congressional policy supporting tribal self-sufficiency
and economic development.' 4
These cases indicate that the theory of implicit divestiture has played an
integral role in the Court's narrowing of tribal powers."5 The Court invoked
the theory in Oliphant to protect non-Indians' individual liberty interests and
has since expanded it to divest tribes of authority to regulate natural resources
and zone lands throughout the reservation.
There are several problems with this development. First, the theory, when
applied, has a totalizing effect upon tribal jurisdiction. In other words,
divestiture works to deprive the tribe of total authority in a given subject area.
It is by nature exclusionary, not accommodating. Montana's "two-prong
exceptions" do not alter this view since the presumption is against tribal
authority and the burden is on the tribe to overcome it; if it fails, tribal
authority is completely divested. Second, the theory lacks coherent structure,
definition, or limitations. As demonstrated, the Court has been unable to arrive
at a consistent formulation of implicit divestiture as a theory and the
circumstances wherein it might apply. In fact, as Justice White noted in
Brendale, the "list" is still developing and may include more areas.
Third, the use of implicit divestiture interposes the Court into an Indian
policy-making position that the Constitution assigns to Congress. This author
has suggested that a significantly different inquiry proceeds depending on
whether the theory is formulated as "inconsistent with dependent tribal status"
or as "inconsistent with overriding federal interests." The latter necessitates
consideration of a legislatively determined set of policy objectives that the
Court must then consider and evaluate. This inquiry, by nature, is more
constrained and gives proper deference to Congress's role in setting Indian
policy. It reduces the uncontrolled judicial speculation inherent in the former
inquiry.
There is no question that Congress's fluctuating Indian policy has produced
significant jurisprudential problems for the modem Court. Changed
circumstances in reservation demographics, land tenure, and notions of tribal
sovereignty all contribute to complicating the picture. There is also no question
that the modem Court should consider historical circumstances in resolving
contemporary disputes. The problem is that the Court has produced no clear
philosophy or paradigm that indicates when particular historical circumstances
will be given authoritative weight and when they will not. As applied, implicit
Superintendent of 'Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962).
174. Id. at 467. In South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993), the Court applied the
Montana formulation of implicit divestiture without any material change. The case is noted to
indicate that no departure or retrenchment from the Montana position is imminent.
175. SeegenerallyAllison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views
of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1
(1993).
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divestiture operates in an ad hoc fashion and confuses, rather than clarifies, the
status of tribal authority. As we have seen, it is not at all clear exactly why
tribal governments retain the power to tax non-Indian commercial entities -
regardless of land tenure on the reservation - but presumptively lack zoning
and other regulatory authority over the fee lands of non-Indians.
The next section will examine a different theoretical approach toward
clarifying tribal authority within Indian lands, one that would allow the Court
to consider history and the vast demographic and social changes that have
occurred within reservations but would also be more consonant with the
prevailing congressional policy of tribal self-determination. This approach
utilizes the discourse of liberal theory. For purposes of the argument, it will
approach the problem in Oliphant - the progenitor of implicit divestiture -
as fundamentally a conflict between individual rights of non-Indians and the
communitarian interests of the tribe in tribal self-government. Some immediate
questions arise: Why bother with liberal theory at all, given its
anticommunitarian reputation? Why utilize a Euro-American philosophical
approach to resolve a problem involving unique non-Western governmental
polities? Will this theory inevitably be subsumed by overarching political
considerations? These are some of the questions considered in the next section.
Ilf. Toward a Coherent Theory of Retained Tribal Powers
According to the Supreme Court, "unwarranted intrusions on [an
individual's] personal liberty"'76 proved antipathetic to a tribal claim for
retained criminal authority over non-Indians."n The result is consistent with
classical liberalism's concern for individual rights and freedom from
unnecessary government action, but it bodes ominously for tribal governments,
particularly their ability to withstand future threats to retained governmental
176. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978).
177. The Court never defines "unwarranted intrusion" but it presumably means criminal
proceedings that do not accord full constitutional protections to defendants. In Oliphant, the Court
specifically noted that non-Indians were excluded from tribal court juries. Id. at 194. In Duro,
the case divesting tribes of criminal authority over nonmember Indians, the Court was concerned
tht indigent defendants had no right under the Indian Civil Rights Act to appointed counsel.
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990). In both circumstances, of course, the Court's remedy
- via the implicit divestiture theory - was to strip tribes of inherent criminal authority. It is
worth recalling that neither Mark Oliphant nor Albert Duro actually faced trial in tribal court;
habeas petitions were successful in both cases. In effect, the Court presumed that the tribal
apparatus would be unfair to defendants and would thus represent an "unwarranted intrusion" on
their individual liberty interests. Contrast this response to speculative abuse of individual rights
in tribal courts with the response to actual abuse of individual rights occurring in state courts.
The tendency there is to reform the system, not to dismantle it piecemeal. See Mark Curriden,
Bar Seeks Indigent Defense Money, A.B.A. J. Oct. 1993, at 44-45; see also State v. Peart, 621
So. 2d 780 (La. 1993) (establishing a rebuttable presumption that defendants in Orleans Parish
criminal court were receiving ineffective assistance of counsel, given an indigent defender's heavy
ca;eload, low pay, and little administrative assistance).
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authority. The result raises questions of whether liberal concerns for individual
rights will lead to further erosion of tribal powers. A broader question is
whether liberalism and notions of tribal governmental powers are inherently
antithetical concepts.
At least part of the answer is subsumed by consideration of whether
liberalism is at all sympathetic to communitarian interests. Recent scholarly
writings in political philosophy argue generally that liberalism is indeed more
sympathetic to communitarian concerns than is commonly thought.' But
these accounts are rarely situated in the context of a culturally pluralistic
environment; instead, they proceed largely from a "simplified model of the
nation-state, where the political community is co-terminous with one and only
one cultural community."'79 These accounts therefore do not adequately
consider the claims of tribal governments when assertions of tribal authority
conflict with fundamental individual rights.
But this is precisely the area where coherent theoretical work must be done.
As Oliphant demonstrates powerfully, these conflicts are the inevitable and
present consequence of a domestic political apparatus that purports to recognize
inherent tribal authority over persons and property within reservation
boundaries while also according significant individual protections emanating
from United States citizenship. Oliphant and its progeny suggest that the
balance tips decidedly in favor of protecting individual rights, indicating that
liberalism's influences in federal Indian law cannot be ignored. Yet there is no
clear theoretical basis for determining why this should be so. Theory, as so
often happens, lags behind the "actual state of things."'"
This state of things requires a closer look at the recent work of political
philosopher Will Kymlicka. In Liberalism, Community and Culture, published
in 1989, Kymlicka sets out to defend liberalism against charges that it is
anticommunitarian. More pertinent to this analysis, he confronts directly the
response of liberalism to a culturally plural country. His thesis, broadly
construed, is that liberalism supports and even requires consideration of cultural
membership, thus providing justification for political strategies that differentiate
along cultural and racial lines. The paradigmatic case for this thesis is the
special status of North America's indigenous peoples, particularly Canadian
Indian and Inuit people, although American Indian communities are considered
throughout as well.
Kymlicka initially sets out his operative definition of liberalism. He is
concerned with "liberalism as a normative political philosophy, a set of moral
178. See, e.g., Heyman, supra note 18; McClain, supra note 18.
179. KYMLICKA, supra note 18, at 177 (critiquing the work of modem liberal philosophers
John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin).
180. This is John Marshall's phrase in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543
(1832).
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arguments about the justification of political action and institutions.''. In
response to charges that liberalism is excessively individualistic or atomistic,
Kymlicka purports to show what liberals can say, not what they have said in
the past." He focuses on modem liberalism, including writers like Rawls and
Dworkin. With refreshing candor, he acknowledges that the "developments
initiated by the 'new liberals' [might be] an abandonment of what was definitive
of classical liberalism."'83 His concern "is to defend their political morality,
whatever the proper label."'" That morality begins with identifying essential
interests. For Kymlicka, that means leading a life that is good. He identifies
two preconditions for fulfilling that interest: (1) being able to lead one's life
"fi'om the inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life;"
and (2) being "free to question those beliefs, to examine them in the light of
whatever information and examples and arguments our culture can
provide."'' 5
The former precondition requires having resources and liberties sufficient
to lead a life from the inside - hence, "the traditional liberal concern for civil
and personal liberties."'" The latter precondition requires having the "cultural
conditions conducive to acquiring an awareness of different views about the
good life, and to acquiring an ability to intelligently examine and re-examine
these views" - hence, "the equally traditional liberal concern for education,
freedom of expression, freedom of the press, artistic freedom, etc., ... liberties
[which enable us to explore] different aspects of our collective cultural
heritage.""' From this statement of essential interests proceed "political
theories which work from an 'abstract egalitarian plateau,' according to which
'the interests of the members of the community matter, and matter equally."""8
Kymlicka describes two distinct kinds of community: a political community
and a cultural one. Within the political community, "individuals exercise the
rights and responsibilities entailed by the framework of liberal justice." Within
the cultural community, "individuals form and revise their aims and ambitions
... [and] share a culture, a language and history which defines their cultural
membership."'" These communities may be co-terminous with each other,
where fellow citizens also share the same culture. This simple model of
"nation-state," argues Kymlicka, underlies most of contemporary political
theory.' More complex problems arise when these communities are not
181. KYMLICKA, supra note 18, at 9.
182. Id. at 10.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 12-13.
186. Id. at 13.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing Ronald Dworkin, In Defense of Equality, I SOC. PHIL. & POL., 24 (1983)).
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coextensive, as in the situation of culturally plural states which form "the vast
majority of the world's states."'' The genuine conflict, according to
Kymlicka, is not stated simply as a struggle between individual and collective
rights, but rather as a conflict in the considerations for showing respect for
persons: "People are owed respect as citizens and as members of cultural
communities.""
In culturally plural societies, "differential citizenship rights may be needed
to protect a cultural community from unwanted disintegration. If so, then the
demands of citizenship and cultural membership pull in different directions.
Both matter, and neither seems reducible to the other."'93 In the case of
American Indians, if one assumes arguendo that the reservation system
operated in part to protect tribal cultures, then Kymlicka's point becomes
clearer. Differential citizenship rights did operate to restrict coercively the
"mobility, residence, and political rights of both Indians and non-Indians."''
At this juncture, Kymlicka suggests that proponents of minority rights,
seeing the writing on the wall, will dismiss liberalism as either "incomplete"
or "entirely inapplicable" and will proceed to find some other moral theory to
support cultural membership and legitimate minority rights.'95 He rejects that
response in favor of one which attempts to reconcile minority rights and liberal
equality. The first response, according to Kymlicka, is not strong politically:
[It does] not confront liberal fears about minority rights ...
[nor] explain why minority rights aren't the first step on the road
to apartheid, or what serves to prevent massive violations of
individual rights in the name of the group. Opponents of liberalism
may find [the first response] convincing, but they may not be the
ones who need convincing on this point. For better or worse, it is
predominantly non-aboriginal judges and politicians who have the
ultimate power to protect and enforce aboriginal rights, and so it
is important to find a justification of them that such people can
recognize and understand. Aboriginal people have their own
understanding of self-government, drawn from their own
experience, and that is important. But it is also important,
politically, to know how non-aboriginal[s] - Supreme Court
Justices, for example - will understand aboriginal rights and
relate them to their own experiences and traditions. And .... on
the standard interpretation of liberalism, aboriginal rights are
viewed as matters of discrimination and/or privilege, not of
191. Id.
192. Id. at 151 (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 151-52.
194. Id. at 146. Recall from part I the federal restraints in dealing with Indian lands were
imposed on both Indians and non-Indians. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
195. Id. at 153.
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equality. They will always, therefore, be viewed with the kind of
suspicion that [lead] liberals . . . to advocate their abolition.
Aboriginal rights, at least in their robust form, will only be secure
when they are viewed, not as competing with liberalism, but as an
essential component of liberal political practice."
Kymlicka's second response, which aims to reconcile minority rights and
liberal equality, situates cultural membership squarely within the domain of
liberalism. Cultural structures should be protected, "not because they have
some moral status of their own, but because it's only through having a rich and
secure cultural structure that people can become aware, in a vivid way, of the
options available to them, and intelligently examine their value."'" Cultural
structures, in other words, provide individuals with a "context of choice" that
allows "meaningful individual choice.' 9
Protecting an individual's context of choice gives rise to a distinct source of
political rights. Government policies that go beyond providing equal rights and
resources - which accord special status to aboriginal peoples - are defensible
but only if they work to correct the unequal circumstances that minority
communities may face. According to Kymlicka, aboriginal cultural
communities are vulnerable to the decisions of dominant cultures in matters
affecting resources (he cites land or means of production that affect minority
communities) or significant policy decisions (including public works programs
that may impact - pro or con - minority communities)." These groups
may incur costs merely to secure their cultural communities before pursuing
their particular goals. Since members of the dominant cultures enjoy a
relatively -secure "context of choice," their resources may be expended
immediately on the pursuit of their chosen goals. Special political protection
is, thus, necessary to correct this imbalance before either community pursues
their differential choice selection. As Kymlicka states, "[R]ectification of this
inequality is the basis for a liberal defence of aboriginal rights, and of minority
rights in general."'
If this synopsis is essentially correct, then we can proceed to consider
whether Kymlicka's liberal approach offers guidance to the particular problem
posed by Oliphant and progeny - the problem of administering law and
justice within the mixed communities occupying reservations within the shadow
of dominant United States political institutions.
Kymlicka provides us a useful analytical starting point by differentiating
between political and cultural comnunities. His argument's primary aim is to
secure the latter communities from domination by the former. This interpretive
196. Id. at 153-54 (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 165.
198. Id. at 169.
199. Id. at 183.
200. Id. at 189.
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construct explicitly acknowledges and confronts the complex dynamics of a
culturally pluralistic state. However, it does not recognize the reality of
politically plural states. This is the situation of American Indian tribes who are
recognized by the federal government as "'distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights' in matters of local self-
government."'" As we have seen, tribes are not constrained by the Federal
Constitution, but their course of bilateral dealings with the federal government
has brought them under federal protection and political dominance."
When Kymlicka speaks about coercively restricting the rights of both
Indians and non-Indians as a means of securing minority cultural communities,
he assumes, for the most part, that these restrictions emanate from the
dominant political authority. After all, it is the political morality of the
dominant institution that occupies his attention. The political morality of tribal
governmental structures within the larger political institutional framework is not
considered. This perspective is imperative in this context since tribal political
aspirations are to assert authority over all persons (Indian and non-Indian) and
land (trust or fee lands) within reservation borders. Is this omission fatal to
application of Kymlicka's analysis to American Indian tribal communities?
Perhaps. A more important question is whether his work moves us toward
clarification of how courts and legislators should resolve questions of tribal
governmental powers and individual rights in a politically plural and culturally
plural society. It provides for a direction toward a more coherent theory of
contemporary tribal authority.
An important step in this direction is to recognize, with Professor Frickey,
that the early treaties and agreements between tribes and the federal
government should be conceptualized as constitutive texts, the "structural
framework" that undergirds the sovereign-to-sovereign political relationship
between the two polities. °3 This approach accords with Marshall's theory on
tribal-federal political arrangements and does seem to underlie modem
congressional Indian policy. The treaties and agreements, like the Constitution,
incorporate a certain political morality that can provide the basis not just for
distinct tribal political rights but for a coherent theory of tribal political
authority. That political morality encompasses the promise of tribal community
persistence and tribal territorial integrity. This is not to suggest that either of
these promises leads to an absolute right to tribal sovereignty.' But it does
suggest that persistence of tribal political and cultural communities is not only
contemplated but is guaranteed. The fact that the federal government has not
consistently honored those promises over time does not detract from the force
201. Santa Clam Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978).
202. KYMLICKA, supra note 18, at 56.
203. Frickey, supra note 136, at 385.
204. See Newton, supra note 19, at 267.
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of these early documents as constitutive texts or their underlying political
morality.
Now consider the complex reservation geopolitical landscape shaped by
more than two centuries of dealings between tribes and the federal government.
Two particularly important historical developments influence this consideration.
First, Indians acquired United States citizenship, most prior to the 1924 act that
unilaterally conferred citizenship on native-born Indians. 5  Second, as
described in part I, non-Indian citizens became residents in significant numbers
on some reservations following the 1887 General Allotment Act. These events,
coupled with federal recognition of tribal political autonomy, created the
circumstances for the politically plural and culturally plural communities extant
on many reservations today. Indeed, allotted reservations have created the
thorniest jurisdictional problems for the Supreme Court, as shown by Oliphant
and Montana.
In the midst of these profound geopolitical changes, tribes have occasionally
succeeded at redirecting the federal government's attention to the political
morality underlying the constitutive texts - the treaties and agreements. This
redirected attention contributed in large measure to the prevailing modem
federal policy of tribal self-determination. As a statement of federal policy,
tribal "self-determination" is often used interchangeably with "tribal
sovereignty," though the two are conceptually distinct. Professor Allen
Buchanan, in exploring these distinctions, suggests that no group is truly
capable of directing its own course, impervious to the influences of global
forces such as environmental crises and world economic markets." He
conceives of self-determination as a value or an interest having high moral
significance that may be served by various degrees or forms of political
autonomy. The value, in its ideal form, is essentially "a kind of negative
freedom, a group's freedom from domination by other agents of change, not the
group's power to shape its world without external constraints."' Failing to
distinguish between self-determination and political autonomy may lead us to
assume wrongly "that the value of self-determination cannot be adequately
served unless the group has the highest degree of political autonomy, namely
sovereignty."' This conceptual mistake, Buchanan rightly points out, can
have serious practical consequences. He therefore urges a conception of
205. Citizenship prior to 1924 was acquired by treaty or statute. See COHEN, supra note 8,
at 644.
206. Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to Self-Determination: Analytical and Moral
Foundations, 8 ARIZ. J. INT. & COMP. L. 41, 47 (1991).
207. Id. at 47-48.
208. ld. at 47.
209. Id. Tribal leaders have often demanded or asserted this highest form of political
autonomy. See, e.g., INDIAN SELF-RuLE: FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTs OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS
FROM ROOsEvELT TO REAGAN 15-25 (Kenneth R. Philip, ed., 1986). But see id. at 290 (statement
of It. David Edmunds (Cherokee)). Edmunds stated:
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self-determination that accommodates and adjusts to differing situations and
conditions.
An accommodative concept of self-determination is thus imperative to
developing a theory of tribal political authority. The search for principles
governing tribal authority is most acute in allotted reservations, where non-
Indian residents may only contemplate state or federal authority over their
affairs, while Indian leaders insist on tribal authority.
Differentiating along lines developed by Kymlicka, it should be clear that
allotted reservations contain two distinct political communities and two or more
distinct cultural communities. If "citizen" denotes a member of a political
community, then allotted reservations contain citizens who are members of the
broader political community, the United States. This political community
would include virtually the entire reservation population - Indian and non-
Indian."' The reservations also contain citizens who are members of a
narrower political body - the particular tribe.2" This political community
would usually encompass tribal members only, most of whom are Indian.
Allotted reservations also contain at least two distinct cultural communities,
broadly construed as Indian and non-Indian. Further differentiation is possible
within both categories,"' but these two general categories suffice for the
There are many definitions of the word sovereignty in Indian America. It seems
to me that the majority of Indians mean "the maximum amount of self-control for
the Indian people under the existing system" when they use this term. I doubt
whether there will ever be complete tribal sovereignty in the United States.
Id.; see id. at 245 (statement of Oren Lyons (Onondaga)). Lyons stated:
I have been called again and again an unrealistic fellow because of my contention
that our people really believe that they are an independent and separate nation. I
sit in a council that has been continuous for hundreds of years. We do not have
the Bureau of Indian Affairs in our nation. We do not have a federal agent. We
do not have anything but Indians. And, in our unrealistic manner, we do not have
federal programs.
Id.; see id. at 291 (statement of Robert Bumette (deceased Rosebud Sioux)). Bumette stated:
We are part of the United States of America. We are within its jurisdiction and
subject to the plenary powers of Congress. So we are not, in a sense, sovereign,
except that we do have treaties and the United States has usually tried to honor
those treaties. The notion of tribal sovereignty is wishful thinking on the part of
most modem day tribal leaders.
Id.
210. The exception may be resident aliens.
211. A further complexity was added by federal policies that occasionally created joint-use
reservations to be occupied by two or more formerly distinct tribes or bands. See SHARON
O'BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 183-84 (1989) (describing the formation of
the Umatilla and Yakima Reservations); ROBERT H. WHITE, TRIBAL ASSETS 189-91 (1990)
(describing the formation of the Warm Springs Confederation of Tribes). For purposes of federal
policy, membership is tied to enrollment with the confederated tribe. The author's use of "citizen"
also refers to membership in the political unit created by confederation.
212. The confederated tribal situation described above, in my view, leads to the creation of
one political community - the confederated tribal community - and possibly several extant
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analysis that follows.
In proceeding toward a coherent theory of tribal political authority, the focus
should be directed on the tribal political community. It is here that the
imposition of tribal laws may intersect with or possibly conflict with federal
interests, including liberty interests that are the concern of classical liberal
theory.
Tribal political action that uses law to resolve, mediate, or enforce tribal
cultural communitarian interests should be accorded the highest form of
respect. Tribal values and needs are directly implicated here. Issues may relate
to such defining concerns as group membership, custody and control of
children, forms of political authority and leadership, the assignment and use of
tribal lands, etc. These expressions of tribal self-determination should be
accorded a high degree of political autonomy. Federal policy may support
tribal efforts to secure cultural communitarian interests but such support should
not convert tribal interests into federal interests subject to federal controls. The
federal role, properly conceived, should be limited to securing the conditions
under which the tribe may pursue its cultural communitarian objectives.
External constraints should thus rarely, if ever, be applied to check this form
of tribal political action.
Tribal political action that uses law to resolve, mediate, or enforce political
interests that are also fundamental concerns of the broader United States
political community may be constrained by federal power, but only to the
extent necessary to accord respect to these overriding federal interests. A
proper respect for tribal self-determination requires that tribal courts be
accorded primacy in resolving any potential conflict between the tribal and
federal political interests. This federal constraint necessarily limits tribal action
but only to the extent that substantive rules or procedural safeguards may be
required to comport with the demands of the dominant federalist structure.
There is consistency between this position and the view articulated by John
Marshall regarding the tribes' political arrangement with the federal
government. It acknowledges that tribes operate within, not beyond, the
parameters of an overarching federal sovereignty. But importantly, it preserves
a substantial governmental and political role for the tribe and thereby still
serves the interest of tribal self-determination." 3
cultural communities - the formerly distinct tribe or band of a particular member. It is beyond
the scope of this article to survey confederated tribal communities where disparate cultural
traditions (e.g., language, religion, etc.) may persist and may be integrated into the political life
of the community. Among non-Indian reservation residents, of course, it is entirely possible for
groups to have retained cognizable boundaries which differentiate along ethnic, religious or racial
lines.
213. Critics may argue that this approach institutionalizes a form of "legal auto-genocide"
where the primary tool of federal hegemony is not overt federal control but rather tribal self-
restraint. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 3, at 274. Implicit in such criticism is profound
skepticism about Congress's assumed plenary power in Indian affairs. At the outset, this article
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This suggested approach does two things. First, it restores tribal political
primacy in reservation government. It does not posit an absolutist conception
of tribal authority; it does not argue, for example, that tribal self-determination
can only be served by according tribes the highest form of political autonomy
- sovereignty. That may well be the case in some circumstances, but not all.
Some tribes neither desire to nor have the present capacity to exercise the
degree of political autonomy that other tribes have or need. These political
arrangements should be the subject of clearly delineated, bilaterally developed
(usually federal and tribal) prospective plans for orderly government
administration, not the result of ad hoc, retrospective judicial rulemaking. In
the absence of such plans, the suggested approach secures some measure of
tribal rulemaking authority, contingent on later revision with the tribe's
participation and consent.
Second, this approach identifies and isolates the only legitimate constraint
on inherent tribal authority - tribal action that may conflict with overriding
federal interests. This interest-based inquiry requires a reviewing court to focus
on positive expressions of federal policy to limit tribal authority. Inquiries that
proceed from an evaluation of tribal powers "consistent with their status" are
vulnerable to manipulation and interjection of stereotype, hyperbole, bias, or
even blissful ignorance. This is not to suggest that the inquiry into tribal
authority is solely a function of the political branches, outside the purview of
judicial review. It is to suggest that there are some limits on the judicial
inquiry that should restrain a court's zeal to "adjust the picture."
Two cases serve to illustrate how this suggested approach may apply. First,
consider the Oliphant case. A non-Indian reservation resident is hailed into
tribal court on misdemeanor criminal charges. The reservation's geopolitical
landscape shows a preponderance of non-Indian residents who own the
majority of reservation lands in fee simple. A focus on the tribal political
community reveals that this particular expression of political action implicates
interests that are also an overriding concern of the broader federal community
- an individual's liberty interest. The tribe's interest in maintaining law and
order, coupled with federal recognition of its governmental status, requires that
the tribe retain primacy in resolving the matter, but it must proceed in light of
federally imposed substantive and procedural constraints.2 '
assumed arguendo that Congress possessed superior legal authority over tribes but it did not
accept that proposition for all purposes. This author accepts that there is some value in
challenging congressional intrusion into tribal affairs (compared to Congress's dealings "with"
tribes, the latter involving legislation affecting the government-to-government relationship, the
former involving legislation directly for tribes), if only to insist on some principled grounds for
such intrusion. The suggested approach to resolving the complex jurisdictional problems on
today's reservations is aimed primarily at restoring tribal political primacy in reservation
government. It assumes that Congress, despite its current supportive posture, will not soon
voluntarily abandon its plenary power position nor curtail the extraordinarily broad license
afforded it by Supreme Court decisions.
214. The Indian Civil Rights Act requires tribes to accord, inter aia, due process and equal
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Contrast this with the case of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez." ' A tribal
member, a woman married to a non-tribal member, raises an equal protection
challenge to a tribal membership ordinance that grants membership to children
of mixed marriages if the father is a tribal member but denies it if the father
is a non-tribal member. Focusing on the tribal political community reveals that
this expression of political action implicates cultural communitarian interests,
specifically, determinations of group membership. While federal policy
supports the tribal member's interest in equal protection of tribal laws, such
support should not readily convert cultural communitarian interests into federal
interests subject to federal control. Tribal authority in this matter should be
accorded the highest degree of political autonomy.2"
The suggested approach to resolving questions of tribal authority in mixed
reservation communities is certainly not free from its own complications. For
example, problems may arise in identifying "overriding federal interests." What
particular expressions of federal interests should be accorded weight? Should
state concerns be assigned a separate value and be factored into the balance?
Are. states truly separate political communities as described above? These
questions have no ready answers, though one would be inclined to answer the
last two questions in the negative. While states regularly challenge assertions
of tribal authority or defend their own incursions into Indian country, they still
must identify some federal authority or policy to support their position. Federal
plenary power constrains state authority as well. It is therefore appropriate to
view state concerns as contingent on overriding federal interests.
Following this analysis, it appears the Supreme Court in Oliphant missed
the mark in a couple of ways. First, the Court conjured a relatively static
image of tribes and their political relationship with the federal government.
protection rights. A defendant not accorded these rights is entitled to seek relief via habeas corpus
petition in federal court. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988). A related form of federal review in civil cases
was created by the Supreme Court in National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,
471 U.S. 845 (1985). This case allows federal court review of tribal court assertions of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians but only after the challenger has exhausted tribal remedies. The case
law following National Farmers suggests that virtually no tribal court decisions have been
reviewed by the federal courts, indicating that the exhaustion requirement provides some measure
of security for tribal judicial processes. See GErcHEs ET AL., supra note 50, at 521. At least two
problems remain, however. First, the federal court review apparently is a "non-Indians-only"
remedy. Second, it exposes tribes to continued challenges on the existence as well as the exercise
of their governmental authority. Under my suggested approach, a National Farmer type of
remedy could be allowed but only if it were available to any challenger and only upon proof that
a demonstrated overriding federal interest was implicated. Exhaustion of tribal remedies would,
of course, still be required.
215. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
216. For a contrary perspective, at least regarding Martinez, see Robert Laurence, Martinez,
Oliphant and Federal Court Review of Tribal Activity Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 10
CAMiPBELL L. REv. 411 (1988) and Robert Laurence, A Quincentennial Essay on Martinez v.
Sanra Clara Pueblo, 28 IDAHo L. REV. 307 (1991-92).
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Despite references to contemporary developments, the opinion is firmly
grounded in the historicism of nineteenth-century frontier America. The Court's
nineteenth-century focus effectively subdued the dynamic nature of the tribal-
federal political relationship, making it difficult, if not impossible, to recapture
the underlying political morality of treaty promises that guaranteed tribal
political authority and territorial integrity. Second, the Court may have
construed the tribe's asserted authority over a non-Indian criminal defendant as
a demand for recognition of the highest form of political autonomy, i.e.,
sovereignty. This level of autonomy would effectively place citizens outside
the reach of protective federal laws. The conceptual mistake, of course, was
failing to recognize that tribal self-determination could be served with less
extreme forms of political autonomy. And, as Professor Buchanan noted,
serious practical consequences can result from such conceptual mistakes." 7
In Oliphant, the Court's response was to accord no form of political autonomy
at all in matters of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The approach
suggested above was developed precisely to help avoid these serious conceptual
mistakes, with their attendant negative consequences for tribal governments.
IV. Congressional Alternatives
The theoretical argument developed in part IfI is essentially directed at the
Supreme Court, urging it to repudiate its implicit divestiture theory and to
pursue instead the suggested approach to resolve questions of tribal authority
on mixed reservations. This possibility rests on slim hopes, since the present
Court does not seem at all inclined to reconsider its theory delimiting tribal
authority."'8 Thus, this final section offers two brief alternatives that Congress
may pursue in the exercise of its authority in Indian affairs.
Reservations that have been allotted pose the most complex jurisdictional
problems, given the multitude of communities residing on one reservation.
Congress can clarify the geopolitical scene by enacting another series of
removal acts. The acts would target non-Indians and non-member Indians who
own land in fee simple within reservation boundaries. Since these individuals
have vested property interests, Congress would have to pay just compensation
for all individuals and families removed. The statutes could provide a specific
period of time, say five years, for relocatees to decide whether to accept just
compensation and remove or remain on the reservation. Those remaining
would become subject to tribal criminal and civil jurisdiction. No state law
(criminal, civil, or regulatory) could apply within reservations. Amendments
217. Buchanan, supra note 206, at 47.
218. In Brendale, former Justice White, in outlining the circumstances wherein implicit
divestiture has been found, specifically noted that "[t]his list is by no means exclusive." Brendale
v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 426 (1989). This
suggests the Court contemplates other areas that may be beyond tribal authority - though these
areas remain unknown.
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may be made to the Indian Civil Rights Act to accord a fuller complement of
procedural safeguards with concomitant increases in appropriations to tribes to
help guarantee those safeguards.219
Of course, this is not a bona fide suggestion, but rather a device to illustrate
that, notwithstanding its recently improved record in tribal affairs, Congress
will only go so far to further the policy of tribal self-determination. Intuitively,
we know that Congress would never pursue such a policy, at least with regard
to non-Indians. But why?
Recall that while Congress repudiated the policy of allotment in 1934, it left
intact the rights of non-Indians whose very presence on reservations, in part,
was to facilitate the assimilation of Indians into American society. The land
interests of resident non-Indians were thus effectively secured. Paradoxically,
Indian interests in maintaining a connection to their traditional lands have been
less secure. The voluntary relocation programs of the 1950s put considerable
distance between many Indians and their traditional homelands. The more
recent forced relocation of several thousand Navajo and several hundred Hopi
tribal members also illustrates the vulnerability of tribal land interests. , ' In
short, despite Congress's rhetoric, its practice has resulted in non-Indians
enjoying more secure land interests than tribal members.
The second, and more bona fide, suggestion for Congress to consider is
passage of legislation that explicitly recognizes that inherent tribal powers of
self-government may only be diminished pursuant to congressional act or by
agreement (i.e., a voluntary tribal relinquishment). While this action may arrest
further use of implicit divestiture as a theory delimiting tribal powers, it does
not clarify or resolve the problem of tribal authority already divested by this
theory. In other words, it does not solve the problems created by Oliphant."'
Legislation that attempts to reverse the results (as opposed to the methodology)
in Oliphant and its progeny creates another set of problems beyond the scope
of this article.' The present treatment will settle for a modest congressional
219. This is to avert a constitutional challenge pursuant to Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
220. See generally Hollis A. Whitson, A Policy Review of the Federal Government's
Relocation of Navajo Indians Under P.L 93-531 and P.L 96-305, 27 ARiZ. L. REV. 371 (1985).
Whitson notes that the forced relocation of over 10,000 Navajo members represents the largest
forced relocation of any racial group in America since the Japanese relocation and internment
policies of World War II. Id. at 372-73.
221. The only precedent here is Congress's legislative overrule of Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S.
676 (1990). The congressional overrule was effected by amending the Indian Civil Rights Act,
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1988). See Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646. In
theory, at least, since Oliphant (and progeny) was decided on the basis of federal common law,
Congress is free to correct the ruling. See Philip S. Deloria & Nell J. Newton, The Criminal
Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts over Non-member Indians, FED. B. NEws & J., Mar. 1991, at 71.
222. Some of the problems, broadly speaking, would focus on whether such legislation
creates delegated authority or affirms inherent authority. If the former takes place, is the rule of
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) violated? If the latter occurs, will amendments have to be
made to the Indian Civil Rights Act to accord fuller procedural protections, such as paid
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corrective measure: ending the reign of implicit divestiture as a theory
delimiting tribal authority.
Conclusion
Tribal self-determination, for many tribes, has only recently moved from
theory to reality. The business of overcoming centuries of dislocation,
disruption, and damage is slow, but deliberate and persistent. It is unfortunate
and paradoxical that at a time when Congress seems committed to helping
rectify the problems it helped to create, the Supreme Court persists in
employing a theory of tribal authority that necessarily moves us back in time,
not forward. This article has attempted to address this phenomenon. Concern
for individual liberties, misconceptions about the nature of tribal sovereignty,
and a palpable distrust for "alien" governmental processes were all factors
contributing to the Court's creation and use of implicit divestiture as a theory
delimiting tribal authority. This article has suggested how many of those same
concerns might be reconceptualized into an approach that addresses the
problem of administering law and justice on reservations - without doing
violence to the concept of inherent tribal authority. Indeed, the suggested
approach affirms a role of primacy for tribal governments.
In setting out these arguments, the author found it was easy to become self-
absorbed with the nuances of theory and detached from the realities of life on
reservations. Images of tribes "under siege" by a dominant "evil empire" are
quite easy to erect. This is not to overlook the tremendous poverty,
unemployment, and serious health concerns facing today's tribal communities.
It may, however, overlook the strength and tenacity of tribal cultures.'
Writers often speak about the "resurgence" or "revitalization" of tribalism, as
if it were an event that began at some identifiable moment in time.
Policymakers may point to the 1960s civil rights movement or federal efforts
in the early 1970s as the genesis for modern tribal self-determination efforts.
This focus overlooks the deliberate but less public work individual tribal
communities have been doing all along to preserve their cultures, their
attorneys?
223. An episode on the Navajo Reservation reminded the author of this important
perspective. Fred Hoxie describes how outsiders got involved in the Navajo-Hopi relocation
dispute after most of the tribal members had already been relocated. National defense groups
were formed and an Oscar-winning documentary film was produced. Hoxie wrote,
In the midst of this rising tide of concern, the Navajos' tribal newspaper published
an editorial. Rather than express appreciation for the support they were receiving
from non-Indian reformers across the country, the editors of the Navajo Times
wrote that the activists should "find another whale to save and move on." They
argued that reformers were polarizing the situation on the reservation and
preventing the Indians from reaching a peaceful resolution of the land dispute.
Fred Hoxie, The Curious Story of Reformers and the American Indians, in INDIANS IN AMERICAN
HIsToRY 227 (Fred Hoxie ed., 1988).
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traditions, and their governments. If the modem era represents anything useful
for tribes, it may indicate that the federal bureaucracy will move off the backs
of tribal governments and allow them to function in more assertive, self-
defining ways. This release facilitates tribal self-determination; it does not
attempt to fabricate it. The Court's use of implicit divestiture is at odds with
this development because it leaves a void in the administration of law and
justice on reservations that must be filled by state or federal authority. It is
time for the Court to harmonize its theory with the real work being done by
tribes and by the political branches to locate the legitimate sources of authority
in Indian country.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss2/3
